






























Books by Allan Savage 
 
 
The “Avant-Garde” Theology of George Tyrrell: Its 
Philosophical Roots Changed My Theological Thinking  
 
A Contemporary Understanding of Religious Belief within 
Mental Health  
 
A Phenomenological Understanding of Certain Liturgical 
Texts: The Anglican Collects for Advent and the Roman 
Catholic Collects for Lent  
 
Dehellenization and Dr. Dewart Revisited: A First Person 
Philosophical Reflection  
 
Faith, Hope and Charity as Character Traits in Adler’s 
Individual Psychology: With Related Essays in Spirituality and 
Phenomenology  
 
Philosophical Memoires: Socially Constructing Christian 
Theology in the Contemporary World  
 
Reconstruction in Western Theism: A Phenomenological 
Approach  
 
The Catholic Faith and the Social Construction of Religion: 
With Particular Attention to the Quebec Experience  
 
The Ecology: A “New to You” View: An Orthodox 










PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 
WITHIN ORTHODOX THEOLOGY 
 
 
ISBN – 13: 978-1481886406 
ISBN – 10: 1481886401 
 
Copyright © Allan M. Savage 
 
Publisher: Allan M. Savage 
 
Manufactured by CreateSpace.com 
 
































A Dissertation Fulfilling the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Sacrae Theologiae Doctor 
(Doctorate of Sacred Theology) 
 
 
at the St Elias School of Orthodox Theology 
 












Even though philosophy is of secondary importance 
with Orthodox theology, the philosophical perspective held 
by the theologian affects the theological interpretation 
given to experience. The philosophical understanding that 
supports Western contemporary interpretation and social 
construction of experience is no longer sustainable given 
the outdated perspective scholasticism that is dominant in 
the West. I suggest that an alternative view, a 
phenomenological method of interpretation, is not only 
more sustainable for Orthodox theological interpretation 
but that is reflects more accurately the Patristic perspective 
upon which Orthodox theology depends. To demonstrate 
this, I investigate two contemporary Orthodox theological 
issues, Ecology and Canon Law, from a phenomenological 
perspective. Within these topics I investigate language as 
participatory, not descriptive; epistemology as being, not 
knowing; and interpretation as continual, not fixed. 
 For reasons summarized in Part Three of the 
Dissertation I conclude that a phenomenological 
philosophical approach is proper to the interpretation of 
Orthodox theology. Avoidance of the scholastic perspective 
by the phenomenological approach prevents 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the Orthodox 
religious experience. This is achieved through the proper 
social construction of the ecclesia that mediates and 
provides the locus for Orthodox theological understanding 
In addition to the proper social construction of the 
community of the faithful within a phenomenological 
approach there is the proper development of the person as a 
member of the community of the faithful. A secondary 
conclusion I make is that a phenomenological approach is 
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PHENOMENOLOGY IN ORTHODOX THEOLOGY 
 
The Interpretive Phenomenology of the Orthodox Theologian 
 
By Way of Introduction  
 
This introduction is needed because philosophy, as it is 
understood in the Western academic tradition, is of primary 
importance to theology, whereas it is of secondary importance 
within Orthodoxy.1 Although, in the West, disciplines other than 
philosophy, such as psychology and sociology, are becoming 
support structures for theological thinking thus reducing 
philosophy to a secondary significance. A Western philosopher, 
Etienne Gilson, moves to redress this secondary significance of 
philosophy by establishing its proper relationship to theology in 
an insightful essay entitled, “On Behalf of the Handmaid.”2 This 
introduction is also needed because this dissertation is 
undertaken by a Catholic theologian, formed in the Western 
classical philosophical tradition, who has come to appreciate the 
potential and wholesome contribution that the Eastern Orthodox 
experience is capable of making to the Western Church. 
Philosophy, being perceived as secondary importance in the 
                                                   
1 Spencer Estabrooks, St. Arseny Orthodox Christian Theological 
Institute, Winnipeg, MB., in private correspondence with the researcher 
in 2007.  
2 Gilson writes: “I propose to suggest as an answer that perhaps we 
are expecting from the handmaid more services than she can possibly 
render, especially given the circumstances under which we are now 
obliging her to work.” Etienne Gilson, “On Behalf of the Handmaid,” 
in Theology of Renewal: Renewal of Religious Thought, Vol. 1, ed. L. 
K. Shook (Montréal: Palm Publishers, 1968), 237.  
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East, however, does not suggest its neglect by Eastern thinkers 
but, rather, being perceived of secondary importance draws 
attention to the various philosophical attitudes as they have 
developed and evolved within the culture in which they have 
arisen. From our own experience we know that a proper 
philosophical awareness alerts us to error. I speak of an 
awareness of philosophical attitudes, not philosophical systems. 
In this dissertation an examination of philosophical awareness is 
made from the point of view of social construction, not 
theoretical knowledge. By social construction I mean what Paul 
Boghossian has described as a core notion of activity dependent 
on aspects of our social context. He writes:  
To say of something that it is socially constructed is to 
emphasize its dependence on contingent aspects of our 
social selves....The inevitable contrast is with a naturally 
existing object, something that exists independently of us 
and which we did not have hand in shaping.3  
In social construction the emphasis is on activity. Social 
construction is something only persons can undertake as 
individuals acting in concert with other individuals.4 As well, in 
the same article, he distinguishes between the social 
constructionist’s claim that is metaphysically grounded, 
(something is real but of our own creation), and a claim that is 
epistemologically grounded, (the correct explanation for why we 
have some particular belief). Without doubt this latter view is of 
particular interest to Orthodox believers. The significance of this 
                                                   
3 Paul Boghossian. “What is Social Construction?” (Monograph) 
<http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1153/socialconstruction.pdf> (28 Sept., 
2007).  
4 Richard Prust suggests this in his book that proposes that 
phenomenological understanding is a new philosophical tool to 
understand the social construction of character.  
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distinction to Orthodox believers will become evident as the 
argument of this dissertation proceeds. 
To that end, I undertake an examination of philosophical 
awareness as an exercise in phenomenology which is an 
existential approach not committed to any particular 
philosophical system but, rather, opposes “the acceptance of 
unobservable matters and grand systems erected in speculative 
thinking.”5 An exercise in phenomenological philosophical 
interpretation is focused on an internal personal awareness, as 
opposed to an external ideological construct. Classical 
ideological constructs, unlike, phenomenological constructions, 
tend to take on a reality independent of the active participant. In 
short, a phenomenological approach characterizes the Eastern 
theological interpretation, whereas, an ideological approach, 
characterizes the Western theological interpretation. More will 
be said about this later.  
The dominant philosophical tradition of Eastern and 
Western Europe is Hellenist. Our present context is the product 
of the evolution of this Hellenist way of thinking. As a result of 
this evolutionary way of thinking we possess an historical 
understanding of our world that was unavailable to the ancient 
Hellenic thinkers themselves, both Socratic and Presocratic. In 
support of this view, Catherine Osborne notes that the 
Presocratic Philosophers “did not call themselves ‘philosophers’, 
or not in our sense of that word, nor did they have a conception 
of ‘philosophy’ as a definite range of inquiries. Instead, they set 
out in search of wisdom, what they called ‘sophia.’”6 As well, 
                                                   
5 “Seven Widely Accepted Features of the Phenomenological 
Approach.” Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology. 
<http://www.phenomenologycenter.org/> (28 Sept., 2007).  
6 Catherine Osborne, Presocratic Philosophy: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ii.  
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often forgotten by contemporary philosophers is that not all 
ancient thinkers followed Aristotle’s understanding that an 
action precedes its potentiality. This Aristotelian understanding, 
that action precedes potentiality, developed into a metaphysical 
ideology that has come to characterize academic Western 
thinking with roots in Aristotle’s notion of an “unmoved mover.” 
John Meyendorff notes that Aristotle’s thought re-entered the 
Western intellectual tradition through an Islamic filter, as it 
were. This is not the philosophical evolutionary pattern of the 
East. Even though Byzantine scholars were aware of Arabic 
writings there was little influence from Islamic thought. He 
writes that “the Byzantines were always able to have direct 
access to ancient Greek philosophy and never needed, like the 
Latins, to ‘discover’ Aristotle by way of Arabic translation and 
commentaries.”7 Thus, in the East there has always been 
available other ways to understand one’s experience than 
through a Western metaphysical ideology. One may understand 
experience through an epistemological interpretation or through 
a poetic interpretation both of which precede any metaphysical 
ideology. The latter, a poetic interpretation, has proven to be the 
evolutionary forerunner of the former, an epistemological 
interpretation. One’s experience is rendered concrete in a social 
construction of relationships as phenomenological activity, 
rather than through the social construction of a metaphysical 
ideology.  
In contrast to Aristotle’s understanding, John Anton 
notes that Theophrastus, (circa 370–285 BCE), a Greek 
philosopher of the Peripatetic school and the immediate 
successor of Aristotle, (384-322 BCE), at the Lyceum, 
                                                   
7 John Meyendorff, The Orthodox Church: Its Past and Its Role in 
the World Today (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary, 1996), 77. 
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understood that the nature of beings, that is, their purpose need 
not be identified as a socially constructed hierarchy. Rather, “the 
purpose of natural beings is basically the producing of offsprings 
like themselves.”8 Hannah Arendt expresses the same notion in 
discussing “the natural fertility of the animal laborans, whose 
strength is not exhausted and whose time is not consumed when 
it has reproduced its own life,” as it relates to Stoic and 
Epicurean philosophy.9 There is no understanding of social 
evolution in producing offspring like ourselves, but rather an 
immovable ground is provided for the development of an 
ideology. Further, in support of this perspective, according to 
Donald Blakeley, Plotinus, (circa 205-270), held that the order 
and harmony of the universe was not centred on satisfying 
human needs and preferences but order and harmony operated 
independently of human needs and preferences. Yet, this is not to 
be taken to suggest a lack of human interest in the activity 
encountered in the world, Blakeley notes.10 The interest in 
activity encountered in the world would eventually give rise to 
phenomenological understanding of the role of social 
construction in the world. But more on this later. 
In our day there is need for theologically educated, not 
merely theologically informed, Orthodox theologians to 
critically address environmental issues and canonical 
                                                   
8 John Anton, “Aristotle and Theophrastus on Ecology,” in 
Philosophy and Ecology: Greek Philosophy and the Environment, Vol. 
1, eds. Konstantine Boudouris and Kostas Kalimtzis ( Athens: 
International Centre for Greek Philosophy, 1999), 22.  
9 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1998), 112.  
10 Donald Blakeley, “Plotinus and the Environment” in Philosophy 
and Ecology: Greek Philosophy and the Environment, Vol. 1, eds. 
Konstantine Boudouris and Kostas Kalimtzis (Athens: International 
Centre for Greek Philosophy, 1999), 32.  
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interpretation within Orthodoxy. Theologically educated 
theologians construct their experience so as to lead them to the 
light and come to be formed by their experiences. The former 
activity, “being led to the light,” is active awareness, whereas, 
the latter activity, “being formed by experience,” is passive 
awareness. Each is distinguishable, but not separable, in life’s 
experience. Within ecological understanding and canonical 
interpretation there is need to re-conceptualize our relationships 
with our community and the world in which we live. Such re-
conceptualization is attempted in this dissertation. First, I note 
that education, for Plato, (circa 428-348 BCE), is an act of 
turning the mind in the right direction to harmonize the activity 
of the soul and to conform to the clearly defined teleological 
boundaries of one’s place in the community. In Plato’s 
educational view the common good takes precedence over the 
particular and individual good.11 The ancient Greek philosophers 
viewed nature as a “theatre of the gods” or as a “theatre of 
reason” which enclosed both human activity and the activity of 
the gods within the cosmos. Further, the notion of “necessity” 
that dominated Hellenic thinking, to all intents and purposes, to 
the point of impeding any option, alteration or change, remains 
influential to this day. Secondly, I note that the above 
understanding is in contrast to the Hebraic view of the world 
where God (Yahweh) works “outside” of nature cooperating 
with individuals and communities to create a better future. The 
Hebraic view of the world is active; whereas, the Hellenic view 
of the world is static. Thus, it would seem that, in the Hellenic 
view any notion of humanity socially constructing a relationship 
                                                   
11 Geoff Bowe, “A Platonic Approach to Environmental 
Education” in Philosophy and Ecology: Greek Philosophy and the 
Environment, Vol. 1, ed. Konstantine Boudouris and Kostas Kalimtzis 
(Athens: International Centre for Greek Philosophy, 1999), 43-50.  
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with the gods that reflects a co-creator relationship is not 
possible.12 As Jane Harrison has written: “Greek writers of the 
fifth century B. C. have a way of speaking of, an attitude 
towards, religion, as though it were wholly a thing of joyful 
confidence, a friendly fellowship with the gods, whose service is 
but a high festival for man.”13 The same author notes that 
Thucydides, (circa 460-395 BCE), and Xenophon, (circa 431- 
355 BCE), sought no definition of religion as such, but that 
Socrates, (circa 470-399), did. Socrates taught that “piety and 
holiness are ‘a sort of tendance [therapeia] of the gods.’ This 
‘tendance,’ Socrates presses on, ‘must be of the nature of service 
or ministration,’ and the Euthyphro adds that it is the sort of 
service that servants show their masters.”14 As Hannah Arendt 
puts it: “For mortals, the ‘easy life of the [Hellenic] gods’ would 
be a lifeless life.”15 Thus, from an Orthodox theological 
perspective there is no opportunity for divinization here in 
Hellenic philosophical thought.  
Among the earliest Ionian philosophers, Anaximander 
(circa 610-546 BCE), Anaximenes (circa 585-525BCE), and 
Thales (circa 624-546 BCE), are understood to be monists in that 
                                                   
12 Philippe Crabbé, “Biblical and Ancient Greek Thought about 
Natural Resources and the Environment and the Latter’s Continuity in 
the Economic Literature up to the Physiocrats” in Philosophy and 
Ecology: Greek Philosophy and the Environment, Vol. 1, ed. 
Konstantine Boudouris and Kostas Kalimtzis (Athens: International 
Centre for Greek Philosophy, 1999), 51-69.  
13 Jane Harrison, “Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion” in 
The World Treasury of Modern Religious Thought, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan 
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1990), 181. 
14 Jane Harrison, “Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion” in 
The World Treasury of Modern Religious Thought, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan 
(Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1990), 182.  
15 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1998), 120. 
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they accepted that there is a basic or common principle intrinsic 
to all things. According to Aven Arntzen, although these 
philosophers recognized a dimension of existence beyond the 
material or physical, this, of itself, did not amount to a dualistic 
view of the world of the type that came to be almost 
universalized by René Descartes.16 From the point of Aristotelian 
philosophy, humans are not merely to live, but they are to live 
well. That is, human acts are to be undertaken in accordance 
with virtue and individuals ought not to dominate others but live 
in harmonious co-existence with others.17 From a 
phenomenological perspective, however, such acts of harmony 
arise within a conscious social construction on the part of the 
individual and on the part of the community. They are not 
theoretically given. To undertake human social construction 
authentically, and in an Orthodox manner, we must no longer 
consider truth as theoretical “representation” of that which is 
divinity. Rather, we are required to experience truth in Martin 
Heidegger’s sense of leaving the question of the definition of 
God open so that God may freely act. James Robinson notes: 
Not only does Heidegger explicitly reject the attribution to 
him of atheism; he even goes on to say that his leaving 
open the question as to God is not a matter of indifference, 
                                                   
16 Aven Arntzen, “Is Presocratic Philosophy of Nature a Source of 
Nature Dualism?” in Philosophy and Ecology: Greek Philosophy and 
the Environment, Vol. 2, ed. Konstantine Boudouris and Kostas 
Kalimtzis (Athens: International Centre for Greek Philosophy, 1999), 
23.  
17 Boudouris, Konstantine, “The Moral, Political and Metaphysical 
Causes of the Ecological Crisis” in Philosophy and Ecology: Greek 
Philosophy and the Environment, Vol. 2, ed. Konstantine Boudouris 
and Kostas Kalimtzis (Athens: International Centre for Greek 
Philosophy, 1999), 59-72.  
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but is rather intended to point out that a more adequate 
category than metaphysics is needed for theology.18 
The point of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the “more 
adequate category than metaphysics” is the phenomenological 
approach in which we encounter the activity of God. In ancient 
Hellenic philosophy there was more than one philosophical point 
of view. The Presocratic philosophers witness to this. The 
academically dominant Western scholastic understanding of 
truth as “representation,” to which the Orthodox theologian is 
exposed, needs to be resisted in favour of an understanding of 
truth disclosed through an historical evolutionary awareness and, 
not in a theoretical, non-evolutionary and non-historical context. 
In other words, a non-western, (ie, non-theoretical), social 
construction is required for the Orthodox interpretation of 
experience. George Maloney notes that “new theological 
problems arose out of the western cultures to challenge Orthodox 
thinkers. The Orthodox faith clashed with secularism and in 
many cases there was initially a lack of theologians capable of 
producing a more creative theology with viable and meaningful 
answers.”19 However, Orthodox theologians turn to Patristic 
theological understanding to generate a more creative theology 
with viable and meaningful answers. Patristic theological 
understanding is rooted in ancient Hellenic philosophy, which in 
turn, is aware of the possibility of alternative understandings. 
The following observations about ancient Hellenic philosophy 
have influenced the arguments advanced throughout this 
dissertation. 
                                                   
18 James Robinson and John Cobb, ed., The Later Heidegger and 
Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 35.  
19 George Maloney, A History of Orthodox Theology Since 1453 
(Belmont, MA: Norland, 1976), 319.  
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First, this study is undertaken in a philosophical way of 
thinking that is not foreign to Orthodoxy. This study is intended 
to assist those Orthodox theologians who, following Alexander 
Schmemann’s mind, seek to escape from “the Babylonian 
Captivity of Orthodox theology to Western Scholasticism.”20 
This study encourages a philosophy that is suited to the 
temperament of Orthodoxy and thus better adapted to the 
personal growth of the Orthodox believer. Secondly, a 
phenomenological approach to theological understanding does 
not “encapsulate” theological understanding. To encapsulate 
notions suggests a theoretical and ideological understanding. A 
phenomenological approach liberates and does not constrain our 
understanding. The Orthodox theologian seeks to experience 
truth from the standpoint of the Gospel and tradition according to 
Thomas Hopko.21 In its historical development outside its 
homeland, that is, in the diaspora, Orthodox theological 
understanding has developed as a minority point of view within a 
Western philosophical context. However, it has managed to 
preserve its distinct Patristic characteristics despite being 
surrounded by a scholastic philosophy that is steeped in the 
Aristotelian tradition. Thirdly, within the European and 
American philosophical climate, developments are taking place 
that reflect less of the Aristotelian perspective, and disclose more 
of the phenomenological European perspective. This 
philosophical climate, favouring phenomenology, aids in 
Orthodox theological interpretation. In addressing the 
interpretation of ecclesial texts, documents, and their contexts, in 
                                                   
20 Quoted by Ephrem Lash, “Liturgy at Elsinore,” New Blackfriars 
88, No. 1014 (2007): 151.  
21 Thomas Hopko, Orthodoxy in Post-Modern Pluralistic Societies. 
St Vladimir’s Orthodox Seminary Home Page, <http://www.svots.edu> 
(28 Sept., 2007).  
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short, Tradition, the ultimate purpose of phenomenological 
understanding is to help the theologian gain an appreciation of 
the social construction of the texts, documents, and their 
contexts, such as may have been lost over time. To recover a 
more ancient theological interpretation is my intent in this 
dissertation as I consider a phenomenological philosophical 
vanatge point from which to address the two separate questions 
of ecological theology and canon law. It is worth noting that 
during the initial inquiries for this research topic, among Western 
theologians, more than once the question was put to me: What 
motivates a Latin theologian to address philosophical issues of 
Eastern Orthodox concern? That such a question is still asked 
suggests that the the optimism expressed by the Melkite 
Patriarch Maximos IV, over the proposed schema De 
Oecumenismo, at Vatican II, has yet to reach many post-Vatican 
II Catholic theologians. The Patriarch wrote at the 69th General 
Session, (18 November 1963), that: 
This schema is the sign that we Catholics have finally 
emerged from the period of sterile polemics with regard to 
both our Orthodox brethren of the East and the 
communities born of the 16th century crisis, polemics that 
have excessively influenced a unilateral development of 
theology, discipline, and even of spirituality.22 
My motivation in studying the questions of ecological theology 
and canon law through a phenomenological interpretation 
follows upon the mind of Plato who, in his Apologia, has 
Socrates say that “the unexamined live is not worth living.”23 
Further, I undertake my investigation from the perspective of the 
                                                   
22 Maximos IV, Chapter 12: Ecumenism. “The Requirements for 
Union, The Melkite Church at the Council,” 
<http://www.melkite.org/xCouncil/CouncilIntro.htm> (28 Sept., 2007).  
23 Plato, Apologia 38a.  
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pastoral theological hermeneutics of Donald Capps.24 He 
suggests abandoning the traditional western perspective in which 
one has been schooled and undertakes a theological diagnosis to 
expose the inadequate formulations of the problem while 
constructing adequate formulations.25 I propose that this may be 
done by a phenomenological approach that replaces theoretical 
interpretation. 
Churches with an established ecclesial tradition, Latin 
and Orthodox, are examining the social construction of their 
rituals and beliefs. In the Latin Rite of the Catholic Church this 
is evidenced in that the Second Vatican Council recognized that 
a more satisfactory understanding of religious practice is one of 
the particularly cogent reasons for undertaking the reform and 
promotion of the liturgy.26 As well, from time to time 
newspapers discuss Orthodox religious issues as significant news 
items of Orthodox contribution to belief in the modern world. In 
an academic context, as opposed to a popular context, Joseph 
Woodill and Paul Tarazi, Orthodox theologians, provide 
evidence of the same phenomenon in articles that they have 
written about the liturgy and the lectionary.27 As well, religious 
                                                   
24 Donald Capps, Pastoral Care and Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1984), 67.  
25 There is a legitimate theological parallel in Christian Orthodox 
thinking according to Edward Moore who writes “when I call for the 
discarding of certain aspects of our Tradition, I do so only on the basis 
of my conviction that certain doctrines have outlived their usefulness 
for the Church.” Edward Moore, “Defining Orthodoxy: Is It Possible?” 
Theandros: An Online Journal of Orthodox Christian Theology and 
Philosophy 1, no. 1 (2003), <www.theandros.com/defining.html> (28 
Sept., 2007).  
26 Austin Flannery, Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post-
Conciliar Documents (Boston, MA: St Paul Books & Media, 1992), 1.  
27 Joseph Woodill. Needed Liturgical Reform Addressed at Fr. 
Schmemann Memorial Lecture. Jacob’s Well. 
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communities, other than Orthodox or Catholic, are doing the 
same. Within the Canadian context, with which I am more 
familiar than the U.S., the Anglican Church of Canada published 
a report in 1993 on the evaluation of The Book of Alternative 
Services in which it addressed the question of liturgical 
dissatisfaction. The United Church of Canada has opted for a 
variety of alternative liturgical services to fulfill its needs.28 
Although writing within a Western perspective, Hans Küng 
notes that such liturgical changes, which began just before the 
Second Vatican Council, affected both Protestant and Orthodox 
Christians. He writes that “while we have been speaking almost 
entirely of Protestant demands, the demands of the Orthodox are 
in many respects the same.”29 These examinations of rituals and 
beliefs suggest that the degree of variation within current 
Orthodox belief and theological interpretation warrants a study 
in the area of philosophy that underpins Orthodox belief and 
theology.  
Often the degree of variation in contemporary belief and 
theological interpretation, within both Latin and Orthodox 
Churches, promotes a lack of uniform with a single institutional 
religious practice. To some extent this may be explained by 
Richard Tarnas’s observation. He identifies secular 
individualism and the decline of traditional religion as the 
overall problem in the West. But this decline is seen as not 
                                                                                                     
<http://jacwell.org/reviews/1997-WINTER-Calivas.htm> (28 Sept., 
2007). See also, Paul Tarazi, An Orthodox Christian Response to the 
Inclusive Language Lectionary. Orthodox Research Institute. 
<http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/bible/tarazi_inclusiv
e_language_lectionary.htm> (28 Sept., 2007). 
28 M. Milne, “Adding New Items to Worship Menu,” United 
Church Observer, January 1994, 12.  
29 Hans Küng, The Council and Reunion (London: Sheed and 
Ward, 1961), 275.  
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totally negative. New forms of social construction may occur.30 
Tarnas writes: “Although the ascendance of secular 
individualism and the decline of traditional religious belief may 
have precipitated widespread spiritual anomie, it is evident that, 
for many, these same developments ultimately encouraged new 
forms of religious orientation and a greater spiritual autonomy.” 
There is a positive result arising from the decline of traditional 
practice if the faithful develop a proper theological 
understanding upon which to base a new social construction. 
This new social construction will reflect the mind of the Church, 
that is, her Catholic consciousness. The new social construction 
will be a product of experience of the uncreated energies of God 
and not the product of speculative theology as is common in the 
West. However, I doubt that the general decline of religious 
belief and individualism, in themselves, account for the 
frustration experienced by those who are actively involved in a 
new social construction of their religious experience. Rather, I 
suggest that an inadequate and thus less helpful, philosophical 
understanding is at the root of this frustration. Leslie Dewart, 
when asked to write a more popular view of his challenging 
book, The Foundations of Belief, commented that though his 
book addresses a “religious” problem the change occurring in 
religious belief is the result of the evolution of humanity and its 
way of philosophical understanding.31 Thus, if he is correct, a 
new way of philosophical understanding is needed. Further, I 
agree with Patrick Sherry that secular individualism and the 
decline in traditional religion are symptoms of the Western 
                                                   
30 Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind: 
Understanding Ideas that have Shaped our World View (New York: 
Ballantine, 1991), 403.  
31 Leslie Dewart, Religion, Language and Truth (New York: 
Herder & Herder, 1970), 10.  
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crisis. They do not explain it.32 Because of our present 
inadequate philosophical understanding this less than helpful 
situation continues to frustrate both Eastern and Western 
theologians in their theological interpretations.  
It is through their acceptance and their use by the 
believing community that religious texts have formulated and 
preserved dogma and doctrine.33 Scholastic philosophical 
expression has become a constituent part of the western religious 
vocabulary.34 A Renaissance interpretation which marks a 
transitional period between the medieval and the modern world, 
has failed to support the worldview presented by the modern way 
of thinking. In the language of a 1947 report to the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, the Renaissance has “led the way to some of the 
tragedies of modern secularism and godlessness.”35 Orthodoxy, 
though never dominated by scholastic philosophy, has not totally 
escaped the societal influence generated by the modern way of 
thinking and belief. Further, Orthodox belief, as influenced by 
modern thinking, seems to have abandoned many Orthodox 
religious traditions as antiquated and meaningless. In the United 
States, this modern way of thinking is often recognized as 
                                                   
32 Patrick Sherry, Religion, Truth and Language-games (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1977), 89.  
33 M. Burbach, “Liturgical Education in the Seminary,” in 
Seminary Education in a Time of Change, ed. J. Lee and L. Putz (Notre 
Dame: Fides, 1965), 429. 
34 P. F. Bradshaw, “Reckonings 7: The Reshaping of Liturgical 
Studies,” Anglican Theological Review 72, (1990): 481-487. See also, 
Avery Dulles, The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System (New 
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Communion. <http://orthodoxanglican.net/downloads/catholicity.PDF> 
(28 Sept., 2007).  
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“Americanization” and espouses the goal of an autocephalous 
American Orthodox Church. Timothy Ware observes:  
This vision of an American autocephalous Church has its 
most ardent advocates in the OCA, which sees itself as the 
nucleus of such a Church, and among the Syrians. But 
there are others, especially among the Greeks, the Serbs, 
and the Russian Church in Exile, who view with reserve 
this emphasis upon American Orthodoxy. They are deeply 
conscious of the value of the Christian civilizations 
developed over many centuries by the Greek and Slavonic 
peoples, and they feel that it would be a disastrous 
impoverishment for the younger generation, if their 
Church were to sacrifice this great inheritance and to 
become completely “Americanized.”36  
Since phenomenological interpretation continues to introduce a 
new philosophical awareness into Western and Eastern religious 
belief we must continually review this awareness from the 
perspective of Latin and Orthodox believers. 
Scholastic philosophy, because of its strict formalization, 
is the least adequate for contemporary Orthodox theological 
understanding. I illustrate this through a phenomenologically 
qualitative approach to certain theological issues. A 
phenomenologically qualitative approach, unlike a scholastic 
theoretical approach, presents new insights for theological 
interpretation. I suggest that the root of much contemporary 
frustration with theological understanding originates in one’s 
qualitative understanding, or awareness, which often fails to 
affirm inherited theological belief. One’s frustration is not with 
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Church History by Kallistos Ware. 
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the social constructions themselves that have been created to 
express religious belief but with the philosophy that supports the 
theology of social construction. A qualitative understanding that 
affirms experiential insight is needed to remedy the present 
inadequacy of our inherited Hellenic philosophical 
understanding. With a focus on the social constructions of 
Orthodox Canon Law and the social constructions of an 
Orthodox understanding of ecology, I suggest that a 
phenomenologically qualitative approach, taking into account 
contemporary developments in existential philosophy, will 
reveal a more satisfactory theological understanding than 
scholastic philosophy.  
Therefore, in this dissertation I adopt a 
phenomenological qualitative approach which I believe begins to 
overcome the limitations of scholastic philosophy. The 
limitations of scholastic philosophy have contributed to the 
frustration in interpreting contemporary experience. However, 
this dissertation also has its limitations which are not all 
overcome by a phenomenological qualitative approach. Unlike 
the scholastic approach, whose primary limitations attach to 
ideas that thinkers construct, the primary limitations of a 
phenomenological qualitative approach attach to the capacity to 
think as such. Qualitative limitations in the capacity to think are 
a part of the natural fallen human condition. As well, there are 
academic limitations to this dissertation. I cite three of them. The 
first is that I limit my attention to the subjects of ecological 
theology and canon law. However, the principles discussed with 
respect to these subjects may be properly applied, inter alia, to 
other theological subjects. Secondly, the discussion in the 
dissertation is in the English language which carries limits with 
respect to the accuracy of foreign language translation and 
nuances of meaning. Often such nuances of meaning are not 
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translatable. Thirdly, there are limits to the amount of data from 
theologians available for research. The internet has alleviated 
this problem somewhat by providing easy access to information 
previously available only via specialized theological or 
university libraries. Finally, given that ecology and the 
environment have only recently come to greater theological 
attention, in any serious manner, there is less written concerning 
ecological theology than canon law.  
Motivated by personal interest I have undertaken this 
self-initiated theological investigation, as a social science, into 
the topics of Orthodox Canon Law and Ecology within Orthodox 
Theology. I have opted for this personal initiative in lieu of a 
corporate-sponsored research programme. Such personal 
motivation is legitimate for social science research according to 
J. Mouton and H. C. Marais.37 It is to be borne in mind that a 
phenomenological qualitative interpretive enquiry is designed to 
investigate meaning, not form. It is not designed for an objective 
presentation of theory nor is it intended to define objective 
reality.38 Changes in philosophical thought do not occur 
uniformly in contemporary Western society. There is often a 
mixture of ancient, modern and contemporary insight requiring 
some sorting out. This will become increasingly apparent as this 
investigation proceeds.  
 
 
                                                   
37 J. Mouton and H. C. Marais, Basic Concepts in the Methodology 
of the Social Sciences ( South Africa: Human Sciences Research 
Council, 1990), 34.  
38 R. J. Silvers, “A Silence within Phenomenology,” Interpretive 
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Darroch and R. J. Silvers (Washington: University of America Press, 
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An Interpretive Phenomenology  
 
Evidence from popular polls and academic presentations 
show that religious interpretation in North America is 
changing.39 This change, already begun at the university level, is 
now taking place at the popular level. Allan Bloom notes this 
change in popular culture.  
Gone is the cosmic intention of placing man in the 
universe. In the direction of the humanities, it is again 
only anthropology that has maintained a certain opening, 
particularly to the merchandise being hawked in 
comparative literature, but also to serious studies, e.g., 
Greek religion. No other social scientists expect to get 
much from nineteenth- and twentieth-century art and 
literature, which fascinated many significant social 
scientists a generation ago, and there are fewer and fewer 
social scientists who have much familiarity with that sort 
of thing in a personal way....Notably, the social science 
intellectual in the German or French mold, looked upon as 
a kind of sage or wise man who could tell all about life, 
has all but disappeared.40  
In the West religious interpretation in general is moving 
from a predominately objective point of view to a predominately 
subjective point of view. A report in the National Catholic 
Reporter (1992) summarizes the results of Gallup Poll: “The 
nation’s Catholics are largely loyal to the faith as they perceive 
it, but increasingly at odds with institutional directives” [italics 
                                                   
39 Thomas Ryba, The Essence of Phenomenology and its Meaning 
for the Scientific Study of Religion. (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), xiv.  
40 Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher 
Education has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of 
Today's Students (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 369.  
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mine]41 Although this phenomenon is observable in Latin and 
Orthodox theological interpretations which share a common 
societal context Thomas Hopko finds that this is a new 
experience for Orthodoxy.42 Since religious social construction 
carries the intended meaning and does not discover meaning, the 
problem is a qualitative, hence personal, one and not a 
theoretical or impersonal one. Further, what Richard Palmer says 
of written texts, such as canon law, may be said of a 
community’s attitude to its social constructions such as 
ecological understanding.  
Literary interpreters can learn from juridical and 
theological interpretation....In both, the objective is to let 
the text lead the understanding and open up the subject. 
The interpreter is not so much applying a method to the 
text as an observed object, but rather trying to adjust his 
own thinking to the text.43  
According to Leonard Hodgson philosophical issues 
precede theological ones and philosophical difficulties “face the 
secular philosopher equally with the Christian believer.”44 David 
Platt also suggests that philosophical difficulties precede 
theological ones and once philosophical “difficulties are 
accepted and faced (and they are real difficulties for faith as well 
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44 Leonard Hodgson, The Place of Reason in Christian Apologetic 
(New York: D Appleton, 1925), 57.  
 29
as for philosophy) we can go on to talk about various concepts of 
God.”45  
An interpretative phenomenology renders the 
interpretation of religious texts in canon law and ecology 
authentic and acceptable to contemporary Orthodox, as well as 
Catholic, theologians. A phenomenological authentication does 
not objectively specify religious truth but invites a meaningful 
understanding of truth on the part of the theologian. According 
to Thomas Merrill in theological interpretation the believer has 
an interpretive advantage over the non-believer by being 
“attuned to the functional intention of the [Christian] author.”46 
The concrete problem of meaningful interpretation of a text, or 
its context, is alleviated for the theologian through a qualitative 
approach to the intention of the author, or authors of a text, 
rather than through merely up-dating the language of a text. The 
way is then open to authenticating an understanding in harmony 
with one’s immediate experience which is not culturally 
Hellenic. 
However, changing one’s interpretive perspective from 
theoretical to phenomenological does give rise to a degree of 
personal anxiety which may be a negative experience on the part 
of some believers. But such personal anxiety need not remain 
negative. According to a Dutch Protestant theologian, with 
experience in the missions, an affirming positive affect is 
possible. “[Theologians] address humankind on its yearnings, 
needs, and anxieties, knowing that we are not speaking the last 
                                                   
45 David Platt, Intimations of Divinity (New York: Peter Lang, 
1989), 209.  
46 Thomas Merrill, Christian Criticism: A Study of Literary God-
talk (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi N V, 1976), 18.  
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word, but convinced that we do offer something essential.”47 
With the intent of affirming something essential, I address the 
issues of a theologian’s interpretive phenomenology and 
personal anxiety  
 
An Interpretive Phenomenology and Personal Anxiety  
 
Theologians recognize that there is sometimes a negative 
correlation between an interpretive phenomenology and personal 
anxiety. Hans Küng is one theologian in particular who notes 
that a personal interpretive perspective can cripple people by 
the fear, ultimately rooted in unconscious insecurity, of 
having one’s own orthodoxy shaken by a reconsideration 
of it...by having insufficient intellectual energy to break 
out of one’s own theological scheme or system, 
constructed perhaps decades ago and defended ever 
since.48  
It must be noted that existential anxiety is most likely 
common to all belief systems but present in varying degrees. 
Paul Brunton, in writing The Spiritual Crisis of Man: An 
Examination of the Concept and the Experience of God, 
develops an integrated Christian and non-Christian 
understanding for modern times to counteract existential 
anxiety.49 He suggests that humanity must work to restore the 
relationship with God, or human beings shall terminate through 
the self-destruction brought on by severe alienation from each 
                                                   
47 D. J. Bosch, “The Nature of Theological Education,” Theologia 
Evangelica 25 (1992): 15. 
48 Hans Küng, The Council and Reunion (London: Sheed and 
Ward, 1961), 171.  
49 Paul Brunton, The Spiritual Crisis of Man: An Examination of 
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other and the human spirit. An individual philosophically and 
culturally alienated from the dominant social context experiences 
a deep sense of personal anxiety. This personal anxiety is 
theologically significant. An experience of alienation, due to the 
dichotomy between theological understanding and experience, 
gives rise to varying degrees of existential uncertainty. However, 
there is a positive aspect to this existential uncertainty. Within an 
Eastern understanding, alienation, that is, failing to remain close 
to God, accords with Origen’s thinking according to Edward 
Moore.  
Origen understands one’s “failure to assent” to God’s will 
as positive in that history is then generated in which God 
can interact and instruct humanity. This position is 
contrary to the Stoics who required conformity to the pre-
destined rational thought of Zeus who grants life to 
mortals.”50 
Existential anxiety is characterized by the individual’s 
inability to specify its source. It arises within the general context. 
By identifying existential anxiety as phenomenological anxiety I 
do not mean the anxiety that accompanies human finite 
existence. I mean that anxiety that results in the separation from 
the “infinite ground or foundation of our being” to use Paul 
Tillich’s language.51 Scholastic thinking, not fitting well into the 
modern world, occasions theological anxiety in Latin and 
Orthodox theologians because it alienates the subject, that is, the 
believer, from its object, that is, foundational being. Since 
phenomenological interpretation actualizes its intended object 
                                                   
50 Edward Moore, Origen of Alexandria and St Maximus the 
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(foundational being), Daniel Guerrière cautions that further 
specification and clarification are needed before identifying 
foundational being with that which is divine, or God.52 It is to be 
noted that some Western philosophers, such as Leslie Dewart, 
hold that God is beyond the foundational being of social 
construction. He writes: “What I have suggested is that 
philosophy today must give itself a meta-metaphysical 
orientation. I have suggested that philosophy should transcend its 
metaphysical stage of development and, thus, initiate its meta-
metaphysical age.”53 
It appears that phenomenological anxiety may be 
overcome to a great degree through an intentional reconciliation 
among God, ourselves and all humanity. I say “intentional” 
which means to say that within the ontological relationship, 
phenomenologically conceived, humanity has never been 
separated from that which is divine. That is to say there never 
has been a separation on the level of being between God and 
ourselves. There has been only an epistemological distinction. 
God and humanity have been, are, and always will be 
ontologically composite of each other in a manner of degree, not 
in kind. This philosophical understanding is in accord with the 
notion of divinization which is the goal of the Orthodox spiritual 
life. As a result, the relationship between God and ourselves is 
made apparent (disclosed) in varying degrees of intensity which 
often gives rise, however, to the appearance of separation. At 
one interpretive extreme is the total identification of the believer 
with that which is divine and, at the other interpretive extreme is 
a total separation of the believer from that which is divine. Either 
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extreme constitutes an inauthentic understanding which is 
corrected within Orthodox theological understanding of the 
personal relationships patterned on the circumintercession of the 
Trinity. A phenomenological qualitative approach discloses a 
similar existential relationship constructed upon the abiding 
unity of the theologian and that which is foundational, that is, the 
divine nature. In short, God intends us and we intend God. 
Dermot Lane’s observation that outdated philosophical 
and cultural influences have “an alienating effect on the present 
generation of Christian believers” is given substance by those 
ecclesiastical and ecclesial social constructions which do not 
induce feelings of peace, purpose, or union due to an outdated 
understanding.54 Those theological social constructions which 
evoke a feeling of frustration and discord produce further 
feelings of anxiety and separation. Since personal theological 
anxiety first arises at a philosophical level, I suggest that such 
anxiety may be resolved, within Orthodoxy, by relying on an 
appropriate phenomenological qualitative interpretive 
perspective, rather than on the inherited scholastic philosophical 
perspective of the West. Thomas Hopko, if I have understood 
him correctly, takes the argument further on a positive note and 
suggests that anxiety could result in a re-creation of reality. He 
writes that “traditional language, structures, symbols and rites 
are recreated to the point where their original content and 
meaning no longer remain at all, but are replaced by a whole 
new reconstruction of reality.”55  
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Frederick Streng notes that phenomenological theology 
has tried “to avoid any procedures for understanding that derive 
from ‘positivist’ or ‘rationalist’ presuppositions, on the grounds 
that [they do] not allow the religious meaning of the data to 
become known” [Streng’s italics].56 A theologian’s interpretive 
perspective discloses meaning derived from an understanding of 
the divine presence in the world. It does not merely describe the 
divine presence in the world. Further, the intimations of a divine 
presence within our experience as theologians give rise to certain 
expectations of encountering that presence on the part of all 
believers. 
According to Avery Dulles the phenomenological method 
of interpretation relies not on scholastic categories but, on 
‘clues’, in Michael Polanyi’s sense of the term, that are capable 
of new meanings.57 The type of theological interpretation crafted 
by the phenomenological approach to interpretation is existential 
theology. Charles Möeller further suggests that the 
phenomenological approach is to be preferred to traditional 
philosophical theory.58 As a methodology, phenomenological 
interpretation is capable of transcending cultures, since it is not 
bound to the categories of a specific cultural experience. An 
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example of phenomenological interpretation or existential 
theology as transcending cultures is given by Wilhelm Jordaan 
and Jackie Jordaan who cite Søren Kierkegaard’s work.59 Emil 
Brunner has explained that 
it was as a Christian philosopher that Kierkegaard created 
the “Existential” philosophy, it was as a Christian thinker 
that Ebner discovered the theme of ‘I-Thou’ - no Greek, 
however great a genius, would have ever understood such 
a theme - it was as a Biblical thinker that Martin Buber 
recognized the significance of the contrasts between ‘I’ 
and ‘It,’ ‘I’ and ‘Thou’.60  
Given that the context of a believer’s interpretive perspective is 
the Lebenswelt, that is to say, the conscious life-world, an 
appropriate phenomenological interpretive perspective alleviates 
personal anxiety in the Orthodox theologian.  
 
A Phenomenological Interpretive Perspective within Orthodox 
Theology  
 
A Rationale for a Phenomenological Interpretive 
Perspective within Orthodox Theology  
 
Phenomenological philosophical thinking is being 
rediscovered in the western world and being applied within a 
philosophical theology.61 As rediscovery leads to tension in 
theological interpretation between empirical thinking, which 
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stresses facts, and phenomenological thinking which stresses 
values.62 In this section I present a rationale for a 
phenomenological enquiry based upon two hypotheses: one, that 
phenomenological interpretive perspective is new to 
contemporary Western thought; whereas, it is likely to be 
recognized as not so new within Eastern thought and; two, that 
the phenomenon of social construction reflects how theological 
existential interpretation is actualized in the development of 
Orthodox theology. About the development of Orthodox 
theology John Behr has written:  
Rather than the dry, scholastic exposition of formal 
dogmatic truths, characteristic of Orthodoxy in the 
previous couple of centuries, this nascent theological 
consciousness expressed itself in a new style, with 
concerns held to be more immediate and spiritual, more 
‘existential’ – again echoing broader developments in the 
West.63  
This dissertation is a theological enquiry undertaken 
within as an act within the faith of Orthodoxy. That is to say it is 
not a report on religious studies. As well, this thesis is being 
researched with an intent to relevant reform in philosophical 
thinking. Therefore, I take seriously the role of the theologian 
who shares in the critical approaches to reform in theological 
understanding. The attempt at evaluating new and critical 
philosophical approaches in light of contemporary understanding 
is a worthwhile cause. From such research individuals and 
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believing communities can both benefit. In this dissertation, I 
propose the new and critical approach of a phenomenological 
interpretive perspective and, on the whole, abandon a traditional 
theoretical methodology. As the argument proceeds, however, 
there will be some overlapping of the two methodologies though 
a phenomenological methodology dominates.64 It is to be noted, 
as well, that Thomas Ryba acknowledges an overlap of 
methodologies when he recognizes phenomenology as a science 
addressing the “new propositions about the conscious 
constitution of the world,” and, as well, as a philosophy of 
science when it addresses “a style of thought, an intellectual way 
of being, or a love of wisdom.”65 Robert Neville also recognizes 
an overlap and makes a strong argument to preserve the 
“theological necessity of speculative thought” and “the religious 
necessity of empirical theology.”66  
The phenomenological approach is, strictly speaking, 
neither purely theoretical nor purely theoretical but it is a 
conscious interpretive combination of reasonable thinking and 
experience. The phenomenological approach is similar to, but 
not identical with, an earlier method of interpretation, that is, the 
pre-scientific method. In his ‘Vienna Lecture’ Edmund Husserl 
describes how humankind left its primal (and phenomenal) 
unitary state which was practical and useful for pre-scientific 
understanding. Interpretation of experience in this unitary state 
was “meant to serve man in his human purposes so that he may 
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order his worldly life in the happiest possible way and shield it 
from disease, from every sort of evil fate, from disaster and 
death.”67 Many Western theologians have abandoned this pre-
scientific understanding by becoming philosophers concerned 
with the pure theoria (theory). This is the situation that Orthodox 
theologians face as well given that they live within a Western 
culture.  
As mentioned above, this is a work in interpretive 
theology (an enquiry) and not a theoretical study of religion as a 
set of norms. One philosopher has written that “[theology] is 
often confused with the term ‘religion’ but should not be, for 
theology is not a type of valuing but a type of inquiry.”68 Yet, we 
are stuck with this distinction which may remain for some time 
between theology and religious studies. The earlier schools of 
theology, which came into being before the global multifaith 
encounter among world religions, had already defined the word 
‘theology’ from a Judeo- Christian perspective. Thus, theology 
has been identified with committed Judeo-Christian enquiry, 
whereas, ‘religion’ has been identified with uncommitted study. 
With respect to religious studies Colin Morris writes: “The 
religions of the Jordan are part of [Western] heritage whereas 
those of the Ganges are not,” in showing how various religious 
attitudes have developed.69 In this dissertation I am not engaging 
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in empirical theology.70 Rather, I am engaging in 
phenomenological theology. Although indebted to empirical 
theology, phenomenological theology is prior to empirical 
theology, as noted above. Neither is this a work in traditional 
speculative theology, “in which the thinker begins with revealed 
or defined doctrine and arranges his materials in an order of 
descent from God to creatures and from existence to substances, 
then to powers and activities.”71 This dissertation in 
phenomenological theology aims to enquire into propositions 
about the meaning of religious experience and advance beyond 
the theoretical understandings currently accepted. An advantage 
of the phenomenological approach, given our contemporary 
concern with individuality, is its potential for the self-revelation 
of the interpreter. As we interpret the interpretations of others 
“we find something analogous in our own moment” of individual 
existence.72 This suggests that the individual does not live as an 
isolated entity but lives as an individual in community. John 
Macmurray has consciously set out to prove this point in his 
book, The Self as Agent. He writes: “Against the assumption that 
the Self is an isolated individual, I have set the view that the Self 
is a person, and that personal existence is constituted by the 
relation of persons” [Macmurray’s italics].73  
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An earlier study has shown that theology has an 
interpretive mandate “based on active participation (praxis) in 
the mission of the ecclesiological community.”74 Vincent 
Brümmer correctly notes that one of the difficulties in doing 
theology is that the theologian is required to master the basic 
tools of other disciplines.75 Phenomenology, as a tool to be 
mastered, is a philosophical method of interpretation acceptable 
to ecumenical theological enquiry, that is, equally applicable to 
Eastern and Western traditions of the Church. While it is correct 
that philosophical theories and tools of the social sciences are to 
be mastered within theological enquiry, they are not to replace 
theological enquiry. Such replacement impoverishes theology 
according to Metropolitan Hierotheosis of Nafpaktos. He writes 
in an article, ‘Secularism in the Church, Theology and Pastoral 
Care,’ that:  
when theology is not a part of this framework, as 
presented by all the Holy Fathers, then it is not orthodox 
but secular. This secular theology is encountered in the 
West, for there they analyze and interpret the Holy 
Scripture through their own human and impure intellect, 
outside the correct prerequisites presented by the Holy 
Fathers. Unfortunately, in some cases this has affected our 
own place, too.76  
Howland Sanks notes that theological studies in North American 
seminaries have been “replaced by training in a series of 
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particular skills needed for the tasks to be performed by the 
leaders in Christian communities.”77 Earlier, Martin Marty had 
observed the same tendency to move away from theological 
inquiry and writes: “Meanwhile, the theologians have moved 
increasingly into the secular academy, where they cannot use a 
church or even the church as an automatic reference group.”78 To 
counter such an impoverishment, it has been suggested by one 
theological educator to integrate the three areas of theoria, 
poiesis and praxis.79 This may be done within a future social 
construction of belief.  
John Macquarrie states that there is no one dominant 
philosophy today in the West.80 It must be remembered that the 
phenomenological interpretive perspective presents itself as only 
one of a number of methods of interpretation and does not 
present itself as a philosophical system. After relating his own 
efforts at phenomenological thinking, William Luijpen writes: 
“It should be clear...that we do not wish to recommend 
phenomenology as the ‘ultimate’ philosophy.”81 This advice is 
given because “we should not expect a single epistemology that 
can equally well subsume sense experience and extrasensory 
experience...mystical experience and practical 
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planning...deterministic systems and normative systems.”82 
According to one phenomenological philosopher “all that 
[phenomenology] can attempt is a clarification of the essential 
structure of experience....Hence phenomenology can supply us 
with a metaphysical knowledge about this one part of the 
universe.”83 As well, another investigator concludes that a 
phenomenological approach to religion should mean “no 
religious or philosophical view can serve systematically as the 
evaluative criterion of authenticity for a specific expression of 
religion.”84 Correctly, Murray Turoff warns that “there is no one 
‘best’ or even ‘unique’ philosophical basis which underlies any 
scientific procedure or theory.”85 I suggest that all the above 
views are consonant with Orthodox theological thinking. 
Further, given phenomenology’s immense complexity and 
possibly inexhaustible range of subject matter, no one group of 
phenomenologists enjoys a monopoly in phenomenological 
interpretation.86 We experience this diversity of 
phenomenological interpretation within an existential context, 
not a theoretical one. The phenomenological method is the one I 
have chosen in this dissertation because it gives priority to the 
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person and because it incorporates recent developments in 
contemporary western thought that are also proper to Orthodox 
theological thought. Yet, Gordon Kaufman warns that “the 
intrinsic anthropomorphism of this [personal] perspective thus 
makes it at once suspect and seductive.”87  
Something greater than mere adaptive change occurs in 
the person who adopts the phenomenological interpretive 
approach. An essential change occurs in the person. There is a 
restructuring of perception. Innovations are introduced into the 
perception of experience, altering the subject, as well as the 
perceived object. In a phenomenological interpretive perspective 
the object of perception is not the independent Platonic ideal of 
scholastic understanding. Rather, the object of phenomenological 
perception is an eidetic object, or web of meanings.88 Unlike a 
Platonic object, an eidetic object is a consciously formed 
(abstracted) object with no independent existence of its own. An 
eidetic object, or an object of the mind, arises from participating 
in existence as dependent upon the subject’s awareness and 
intent.89 In short, the eidetic object is the product of a conscious 
relationship. The eidetic reduction is the method of rendering 
experience as susceptible of universal understanding. This 
understanding is not something other, that is, objective, but 
rather is the disclosure of the logical structure of phenomena, 
apparent to one’s mind or understanding, that constitutes the 
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phenomena. Hence, as the subject’s awareness changes, the 
eidetic object of consciousness changes. This understanding has 
profound implications for the Orthodox theologian when it 
comes to discussing the divine-human reality of the church as an 
historical and socially constructed reality. 
The phenomenological interpretive perspective places 
emphasis on dynamic intersubjectivity. A religious 
phenomenological interpretive perspective has the potential to 
bring about a spiritual self-transformation.90 Others understand 
rhetoric to play a role in this personal transformation.91 The 
exchange of notions between, or among persons, transforms 
these same persons. Religious transformation, however, is not 
identical to the notion of metánoia. Metánoia means a conversion 
to another’s way of thinking and acting, “an utter interior 
reorientation,” which must be willfully sustained.92 Metánoia, as 
spiritual self-transformation, is not an accommodation to the will 
of another but an adjustment in the relational unity with another. 
For spiritual growth to occur constant adjustment is required in 
this relational unity. This constant adjustment results in a new 
social construction of the theologian’s experience.  
Psychologists Henryk Misiak and Virginia Sexton 
understand phenomenology as a movement with a common 
psychological core as well as a movement with a variety of 
expression.93 From a phenomenological point of view the 
common psychological core replaces the objective being of 
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scholastic philosophy (an ontological idealism), in which objects 
exist independently of consciousness, with a contemporary world 
of subjective construction, (the eidos of phenomenology), which 
depends on consciousness.94 This consciousness constitutes the 
human being and opens up new horizons for interpretation. 
Further, explaining Husserl, Robert Magliola writes: 
“Consciousness is wrongly considered a faculty for being 
conscious instead of an act of being conscious” [Magliola's 
italics].95 Distinguishing scholastic ontological understanding 
from phenomenological ontological understanding John Heritage 
writes that 
the phenomenologist makes a strong distinction between, 
on the one hand, a sensory presentation and, on the other, 
an intended object constituted of the sensory presentation. 
From a phenomenological perspective, all objects of 
consciousness whether referred to the real world...or to 
one or another ideal world...exist as the products of 
constitutive acts of consciousness. As such they stand as 
unities of meaning which are established in their moments 
of recognition.96  
In phenomenology, the term “constitutes” can be used in 
various senses. I follow Herbert Spiegelberg’s explanation of 
Husserl’s use of the term meaning that “each object of 
                                                   
94 Misiak and Sexton explain that “the word eidetic comes from 
eidos, meaning essence, borrowed by Husserl from Plato....This 
procedure of getting to the essences themselves, Husserl called eidetic 
reduction.” Henryk Misiak and Virginia Sexton, History of Psychology: 
An Overview (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1966), 409. 
95 Robert Magliola, “Like the Glaze on a Katydid-wing: 
Phenomenological Criticism,” in Contemporary Literary Theory eds. 
D. G. Atkins and L. Morrow (Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts, 1989), 103.  
96 John Heritage, Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology (Cambridge, 
UK: Polity, 1984), 42. 
 46
experience establishes itself, or ‘settles’ in our experience by 
taking shape before our eyes, as it were.”97 This brief discussion 
has provided a rationale for the phenomenological interpretive 
perspective within Orthodox belief that I undertake in this 
dissertation.  
 
A Phenomenological Interpretive Perspective is Proper 
to Orthodox Theology 
 
Existential theology, which incorporates a 
phenomenological interpretive perspective, differs essentially 
from scholastic theology in that existential theology interprets 
the eidetic (mental) objects of consciousness, whereas scholastic 
theology interprets the theoretical objects of the intellect. Within 
scholasticism, theoretical theological questions and answers are 
governed within a fixed idea of nature. In this context a notion of 
contingency being anything but accidental is impossible to 
conceive.98 Moreover, truth expressed in theoretical terms 
becomes fixed in a particular form of expression that itself is 
perceived to be as valid as the truth. This “fixed expression” of 
truth is still a problem for scholastic theologians but as Edward 
Moore notes such a problem as “fixed expression” did not exist 
for the immediate successors of Plato. He notes “the fact that 
Speusippus, the first Platonic successor...engaged in an 
explication of metaphysical concepts indicates that there was no 
uncontested doctrine – and certainly no dogma – bequeathed by 
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Plato....”99 The problem arose later and a Dutch theologian notes 
the problem in traditional South African Afrikaner theological 
thinking which is formed by an interplay of Afrikaner culture 
and Reformed theology.100 As well, Ernest Keen cites the same 
problematic of a fixed expression occurring in psychology.101 
Such developments are being resisted within Orthodox theology.  
Frank Gavin distinguishes between development and 
evolution and discusses the relationship between philosophy and 
Orthodox theology which led to a new way of thinking. He 
maintains that there is a fundamental difference between 
theology and philosophy.  
Philosophy has changed, abrogated, altered, and discarded 
its systems. In each such case there was an evolution, not a 
development – a creation of a fundamentally and 
essentially different type, resting on a different premises 
and developing different conclusions. In Christian 
thought, on the contrary, there was undoubtedly a 
development, but no evolution, in the sense of the 
emergence of an essentially different type [of thought]. 
While a given philosophical system rests on the dogmas of 
its founder, it is destroyed when their authority is 
questioned and denied. The data of Christian theology are 
the content of the teaching of its Founder, the Incarnate 
God, and His authority is always accepted and affirmed. 
Consequently the development of Christian theology is a 
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fact, while the evolution of its content is an impossibility, 
for it remains to same [Gavin’s italics].102 
In existential theology, which incorporates a 
phenomenological perspective, a relational and dynamic 
conception of truth replaces a fixed idea of truth. Thus, fixity of 
expression is not a problem in existential interpretation since 
concepts have no independent existence that can become fixed in 
their expression. Existentialist thought, being an alternative to 
classical thought, has not developed sui generis (out of itself) in 
a void without terms of reference. History shows us that 
philosophical schools of thought are related and do not come into 
being independently of each other. Rather, they constitute frames 
of reference for each other. Exploring an existential 
understanding, Leslie Dewart, a Western philosopher, writes that 
“it would hardly make sense to say that the relationship of the 
mind to its objects was irrelevant to the truth of experience, or 
that experience might be true regardless of whether it took into 
account what reality was.”103 He is able to make this claim 
because in existential interpretation existence is understood as 
dynamic being, unity is understood as relational and, necessity is 
replaced by option. 
Within the Western context the scientific way of 
knowing is the present fashionable way of knowing. However, 
an alternative, the phenomenological way of knowing, is 
available to Western philosophers, both Orthodox and Latin. The 
phenomenological methodology of existential interpretation 
presents a new type of scientific and qualitative way of knowing 
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which incorporates analytical thinking. Like scholastic 
interpretation, existential interpretation, is aware of its own 
understanding of being that transcends the physical. In this 
understanding phenomenological thinking does not construct a 
scholastic metaphysics but rather constructs social eidetic objects 
which have no extra-mental existence.104 Phenomenologically-
minded philosophers reject any scientific way of knowing which 
claims to duplicate the nature of things. “The so-called ‘laws of 
nature’ should not be seen as ontological entities, but are ways of 
representing the observed - they are not nature as such.”105 In 
phenomenology eidetic objects are recognized as data which 
refer to phenomena and consciousness.106 At this point the 
Orthodox theologian should be able to recognize the significance 
of these statements with respect to interpretation of the scared 
mysteries of the Church and their subsequent social construction. 
A phenomenological interpretive perspective arises out of 
immediate reflection on experience, not reflection on pre-
existing theoretical formulae. The phenomenological interpretive 
perspective is not determined by pre-existing theoretical causes. 
Further, in phenomenological interpretation there is no past or 
future that concretely exists. There is only the perpetual present 
moment of existence which is susceptible to interpretation. Past 
events, which are memories, are recalled to the present moment, 
and hypothetical conceptions of the future, which are models, are 
yet to be actualized. Robert Sokolowski suggests:  
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The re-presenting and reliving of a past act should not be 
confused with reflection on the act. In a reflection we 
thematize an act that we are still living through; 
remembering does not thematize a past act, but revivifies 
it and goes through it again – at a distance, with a sense of 
its otherness to the present process of remembering.107  
The phenomenological interpretive perspective remains 
open to the future, while revealing the needs of the present age, 
and understands the preservation of any former 
conceptualizations not to be necessary. Remaining open to the 
future does not mean being free from direction. Being open to 
the future is possible for persons or communities who know who 
they are in the present moment of their existence. In Edmund 
Husserl’s words: “Perception is related only to the present. But 
this present is always meant as having an endless past behind it 
and an open future before it” [Husserl’s italics].108 Poetry, it 
seems to me, presents itself in a similar manner. According to 
one researcher the believer does not “hang on to old ideas out of 
fear that they are irreplaceable but instead seeks to improve them 
or replace them with better ideas.”109  
The phenomenological interpretive perspective arises 
out of present experience and discloses new scientific 
understanding without prejudice to scholastic understanding. 
This is to say that earlier forms of thought have had their 
influence in the evolutionary development of 
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phenomenological enquiry. Phenomenological enquiry has 
evolved out of a traditional investigative methodology 
preserving what is of value from the past while introducing 
something new in the present. In this sense the present is not 
divorced from the past but rather has evolved from it.110 Allan 
Bloom cites the evolutionary development of the thought of 
René Descartes who had a whole world of old beliefs, of pre-
scientific experience and understanding of the order of things 
before he began his systematic doubt. He notes that 
Heidegger returned to pre-existing thought forms in 
developing his ideas. 
But it was Heidegger, practically alone, for whom the 
study of Greek philosophy became truly central, a pressing 
concern for his meditation on being....A new beginning 
was imperative, and he turned with open mind to the 
ancients. But he did not focus on Plato or 
Aristotle....Heidegger was drawn instead to the pre-
Socratic philosophers, from whom he hoped to discover 
another understanding of being to help him replace the 
exhausted one inherited from Plato and Aristotle, which he 
and Nietzsche thought to be at the root of both Christianity 
and modern science.”111 
Leslie Dewart notes a similar evolutionary development 
occurring in epistemological thinking. He writes: “The 
phenomenological method...is not the diametric opposite of the 
ontological; it is a more comprehensive one than the latter, 
whose merits it preserves and whose inadequacies it tries to 
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remedy” [Italics mine].112 This evolutionary pattern, from old to 
new, continues as existential thinkers incorporate analytic 
components into their phenomenological interpretive 
perspectives. This blending of the analytical with the intuitive in 
the phenomenological approach constitutes a new approach to 
the scientific method of enquiry and social construction. Further, 
this new approach is proper to an Orthodox theological 
understanding.  
 
Three Phenomenological Social Constructions and Their 
Interpretive Perspectives  
 
Social Construction One: Participatory Language, not 
Descriptive Language  
 
During the Renaissance theological thinking in the West 
was dominated by intellectually minded clerics who thought in 
theoretical terms. David Martin suggests that monasteries were 
the loci for such theoretical thinking and that monks who were 
“careful scholars” attracted many people who believed that 
“knowledge was to be sought after in monasteries.”113 Betty 
Knott however, understands the development of theological 
thought to have taken place within all sectors of society during 
the Renaissance. At this time there was a revival of the 
devotional spirit not only in the monasteries, but among those 
members of the Church who spent their lives in the world, 
among clergy and lay-people, among educated and 
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uneducated.114 But, ultimately, in the West the clericalization of 
theology dominated with an over-emphasis on the ecclesiastical 
perspective in the interpretation of scholastic thought. A priestly 
theology had developed in the West whereas this was not the 
case for theological developments in the East. Thus, theological 
interpretation in the West focused on abstract and descriptive 
theological concepts rather than on the existential interpretation 
the life-world, which, it may be argued, characterized the East. 
In short, Western theology succumbed to the clericalism to 
which it was exposed.115 This clericalism in theology has had 
negative effects within Western Christendom and threatens 
Orthodoxy today. Particularly through its missionary activity 
western Christendom imposed a foreign view on many cultures 
in spreading the gospel. Often indigenous cultures received the 
western gospel as a legacy of colonialism. The Institute of 
Contextual Theology notes that European theology was 
developed in foreign settings “such as the monastery or the 
world of academics in seminaries or universities or in 
ecclesiastical and clerical circles or in the context of Western 
culture and liberal capitalism and almost always in the context of 
middle class comfort and complacency.”116  
Existential theologians pay attention to language as a 
personal, but not private, participatory meaning system. 
Language, as a meaning system, is to be understood without 
prejudice to language as a sign system. Eugene Fontinell states 
that our linguistic “concepts are participational rather than 
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representational.”117 Richard Tarnas traces this participatory 
dimension as having its beginning with Kant and developed with 
Goethe, Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel. He notes that “each of 
these thinkers gave his own distinct emphasis to the developing 
perspective, but common to all was a fundamental conviction 
that the relation of the human mind to the world was ultimately 
not dualistic but participatory.118 Along with another theologian I 
hold the view that “theological language is convictional language 
of a special type” but not necessarily a confessional language.119 
I suggest further that religious convictional language is unique 
due to its participatory, not merely descriptive character. Earlier, 
Paul Tillich articulated the same thought.120 Further, religious 
language defies conventional semantics, according to Carl 
Raschke and is “self-consciously revelatory.”121 Some 
theologians understand that theological language is to function as 
explanatory since theology is a technical discipline, its “technical 
language,...an outgrowth of ordinary language,...must be 
accepted...in an explanatory context...to achieve a more 
developed understanding of reality.”122 By “explanatory,” 
MacKinnon does not mean “representational” in the sense of 
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duplicating reality, but rather, means “representational” as 
actualized in a personal context. In short, he speaks of a 
conscious personal participation in the interpretation of the 
lifeworld. In discussing literary God-talk, Thomas Merrill states 
that “God-talk is nothing without audience participation, and to 
assure participation it leaves its canvases incomplete.”123 I 
suggest that among these “canvases” is theological social 
construction. The canvas of theological social construction is left 
incomplete to assure our participation. Wolfgang Iser speaks of 
the “authortext-reader relationship” not as representational but 
“as material from which something new is fashioned.”124 I 
suggest the same is true of an “author-social construction-actor” 
relationship. To fashion something new requires the active 
participation of a subject (person) with an object (another person 
or a thing) in the unity of a dialectical relationship. A personal 
conscious structuring of the life-world, or, which is the same 
thing, the social construction of the life-world, is accomplished 
through experience, not inherited from tradition. 
In identifying the field of participational theology, Hans 
Küng writes: “What is at stake here is our everyday, common, 
human, ambiguous experiences not, as in earlier theology, the 
elitist experiences of intellectual clerics.”125 Gregory Baum says. 
“Many Christians of our day desire to speak about the reality in 
which they believe in a language and in terms that are in 
continuity with ordinary experiences of life.”126 Yet, most people 
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do not use religious a language which reflects contemporary life 
experience when contemplating a social construction. As 
reported in M. Coxhead: “If they do not use traditional religious 
language, most people are struck dumb when they try to describe 
the meaning of their experience.”127 One researcher has 
maintained that the old models of social construction are still 
used in religious understanding.128 The choice of theological 
language determines the socially constructed meaning of an 
individual and collective faith when interpreting the life-world. 
Thus, as an existential theologian I interpret social construction, 
phenomenologically, from a participatory context within the life-
world, not a descriptive or theoretical context.  
 
Social Construction Two: An Epistemology of Being, not 
an Epistemology of Knowing  
 
I show in this section a shift in epistemological thinking 
from a scholastic to a phenomenological understanding. I follow 
Frederick Sontag, in that philosophy, properly understood, is 
supportive of theology as a theologica ancillae. Sontag suggests 
that “when philosophy regains its rightful place, asking questions 
that no science can determine for it, it becomes less certain but 
also more flexible so that theology can once again utilize its 
support.”129 Philosophy, which assists in formulating doctrine, is 
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a natural human activity and is not to be confused with 
revelation.130 Frederick Sontag speaking of the Western context 
states: “For all too long theologians, while realizing their kinship 
to philosophy, have acted like men determined to think that some 
particular philosophy was required of them.”131 As the scholastic 
theologian needs a secure grasp of Aristotelian thought and 
presumptions, so too, the phenomenological theologian needs a 
secure grasp of existential methodology and presumptions. 
Existential methodology and presumptions are better suited to 
assist the Orthodox believer than scholastic though and 
presumptions. Two phenomenological philosophical 
presumptions I make in this dissertation on social construction 
are that:  
- knowing is actualized in existential consciousness. It 
is not an act of intellectual apprehension of theoretical 
constructs.  
- unity is actualized in a conscious activity of 
dialectical relationships rather than the intellectual and 
theoretical union of subject and object.  
 
Understood in this manner both knowing and unity are 
intentional activities. According to the scholastics, knowledge is 
the deliberate act through which a human subject unites itself to 
an object, an act through which the intellect unites itself to being. 
This definition of knowing presumes a dichotomy between the 
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knower and the known. Merleau-Ponty suggests that in 
phenomenology the relationship between the knower and the 
known is of dynamic being, not of theoretical knowing. He 
writes that “the relationship between the subject and object is no 
longer that relationship of knowing postulated by classical 
idealism, wherein the object always seems the construction of 
the subject, but a relationship of being in which paradoxically, 
the subject is his body, his world, and his situation, by a sort of 
exchange” [Merleau-Ponty's italics].132 Thus, in intentional 
activities, no dichotomy constitutes the social construction of the 
life-world of a conscious being. In the life-world of conscious 
social construction there is differentiation and distinction within 
being, but no separation of being. 
Scholastic knowledge is structured upon theoretical 
concepts which themselves are structured upon previous 
concepts.133 Scholastic knowledge consists of theoretical 
interpretations which are theoretical interpretations of 
interpretations ad infinitum. Phenomenological knowledge 
differs from scholastic knowledge in that conscious (intended) 
phenomenological knowledge is constituted out of the present 
moment of being (existence). Noetic concepts, constructions of 
the human mind, are not revisions or refinements of ideal 
concepts but are actualizations of the present moment of being. 
Thus, the old schema of theoretical knowledge is not perpetuated 
nor preserved in a phenomenological interpretation of being 
which involves the subject’s participation. 
                                                   
132 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-sense (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University, 1964), 72.  
133 H. A. Hodges, God Beyond Knowledge (London: Macmillan, 
1979), 111. Also, Fraser Watts and Mark Williams, The Psychology of 
Religious Knowing. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
51.  
 59
Traditional epistemological theory presents itself 
primarily, but not exclusively, as objective and objective 
interpretation can be understood independently of the spectator’s 
point of view. A phenomenological epistemology of being 
presents itself primarily, but not exclusively, as subjective. 
Thomas Torrance, writing of the subjective in the Christian 
legacy, states that “this subjective aspect, more evident in the 
Lutheran than in the Calvinist Reformation, was fostered 
everywhere by the spirit of the Renaissance in its humanism and 
individualism.” He says that, prior to the Reformation 
subjectivism is disclosed through “the Augustinian stress upon 
religious selfconsciousness, inward conviction, and the passion 
of the soul.”134 Objectivism is a theoretical (speculative) 
philosophical term, whereas, objectivity is a phenomenological 
(existential) philosophical term for the same perception. These 
terms are not to be confused. Subjectivity is not to be confused 
with subjectivism. Subjectivism and objectivism denote a 
specific doctrine or system of knowledge, whereas subjectivity 
and objectivity are notions connoting a phenomenological and 
socially constructed understanding of the life-world. Thus, the 
phenomenological approach is not, of necessity, in conformity 
with any pre-given system of knowledge but is of a dynamic 
construction. 
In an epistemology of being the boundaries of a 
relational state are not fixed as in a theoretical epistemology. In 
an epistemology of being one must think in terms of subjectivity 
and objectivity rather than in terms of subjectivism and 
objectivism. On account of such subjective interpretation, the 
author’s biography is consciously or unconsciously, incorporated 
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into any interpretation of experience.135 Hence, Graham Stanton 
notes that what is omitted in a biography may tell as much as 
what is included.136 The context in which interpreters interpret 
ought to be known to the reader according to one researcher who 
suggests that philosophers justify their choices of methods and 
techniques.137 Such conditions will be addressed in the 
interpretation of the theological texts considered as social 
constructions in this dissertation.  
Theologians interpret the experience of their life-world 
according to the epistemological norms of their day. Thomas 
Aquinas, whose interpretations were greatly influenced by 
Aristotle, taught that human knowledge comes through one’s 
native capacity to know and through one’s experience.138 This 
fits with scholastic Western thinking. Phenomenological 
knowledge, on the other hand, occurs through differentiation 
within the existential life-world of knower and known.139 The 
phenomenological unity of the life-world precedes any 
interpretation or differentiation. Today, the experience of many 
Western theologians, and many Orthodox theologians 
inordinately influenced by Western thinking, is that theology 
suffers from a reliance on scholastic epistemology in interpreting 
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religious experience. To alleviate this difficulty I suggest that 
theologians ought to undertake an existential approach and 
subscribe to an epistemology that discloses the conscious 
differentiation of being. 
Philosophy, as a human social construction, is capable of 
various expressions. Among them is psychology. Psychological 
social constructions reflect philosophical perspectives as is 
evidenced by Fraser Watts and Mark Williams who note that 
Thomas Aquinas conceived of an act of knowing which is not in 
conformity with classical scholastic expression. In discussing the 
psychology of religious knowing, they write:  
Among theologians, Aquinas described “knowledge by 
connaturality”,...a knowledge of acquaintance, 
corresponding to that of the lover and the loved....This 
kind of contemplative knowledge of God...suggests the 
possibility of direct religious knowing [italics mine].140  
Direct religious knowing is phenomenological knowing 
in which a dichotomy between knower and known is not 
constructed. This direct religious knowing is an exception in 
Thomas Aquinas’s thinking. This particular example in his 
understanding supports the point made earlier that philosophical 
thinking develops contextually through evolution and is not sui 
generis. William Luijpen states that religious knowing belongs 
to the existential category of “love.” He writes that love is the 
only “category which can be thought to affect beings in such a 
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way that freedom ensues.”141 That love brings freedom is not 
only a philosophical concept but a psychological one as well. In 
his book, The Art of Loving, written from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, Erik Fromm concludes that the practice of love 
results in “the overcoming of one’s narcissism,” permitting true 
freedom for the individual [Fromm’s italics].142 Also, concerning 
the work of Alfred Adler and Orthodox theology, Jamie Moran 
writes that “his teaching on ‘social interest’ or ‘social feeling,’ 
and sickness as the person’s abuse of this via a false 
individualism of power, rather than communal contribution, is a 
huge step towards understanding the Holy Spirit’s task of 
creating a communion of persons.”143 
Brain Gaybba, echoing the understanding of the Fathers, 
speaks of love as knowledge, a view that is particularly 
characteristic of the monastic theological tradition. Gaybba 
writes:  
This sort of knowledge has been given various names: 
connatural knowledge (because it derives from the soul’s 
becoming like God, one nature with God, so to speak); 
affective knowledge (because it is inextricably linked to 
the soul’s personal relationship to and savouring of God); 
or simply experiential knowledge – the cognitio 
experimentalis. The stress on this type of knowledge is 
due to two factors in monastic culture. The first is the aim 
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of monastic life. The second is the neo- Platonic world-
view in which it was conceived.144 
Paul Tillich expresses much the same notion this way: “Love is 
the drive to bring together that which has been separated.”145 In 
Tillich’s thought “separated” does not mean “divided.” Rather, it 
is closer in meaning to “distinguished.” Though the lover and the 
loved are distinguished, a bond remains. In short, the lover and 
the loved are dialectically united.146 
In scholastic epistemology, knowledge results in the 
identification of the quiddity of essences. In a phenomenological 
epistemology of being, however, knowledge, or one’s coming 
consciously to be, is actualized through self-differentiation of the 
self from the non-self. Such differentiation constitutes the human 
subject and it is characteristic of human behaviour within history 
and cultural formation. Such differentiation occurs in a 
dialectical relationship between two poles (self and non-self) yet 
these poles are not to be understood as unconnected. They are 
related within a dialectical unity. A subject which lacks a self-
reflexive consciousness, that is to say, a self not conscious of 
itself, or a knower not knowing that he or she knows, or a lover 
not loving of himself or herself, cannot be aware of this 
relationship. Nor can such a subject be a subject in the personal 
sense of the term. The knower is aware of this process of 
differentiation, or, put alternatively, the knower is aware of 
knowing, the human being is aware of being human, and the 
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lover is aware of loving. This self-reflexive understanding is part 
of the qualitative research approach I have taken in this 
dissertation.147 
In the ancient Greek context, any dynamic activity, 
movement, growth, development and meaning all occur in a 
closed system.148 But in a phenomenological epistemology of 
being the interpretive context is the open system of one’s 
existence in the world. Of this openness Herbert Spiegelberg 
writes: “Now openness...is to a considerable extent a matter of 
active control: we can open (or close) our mind and we can get 
set for an experience (and just as well guard ourselves against an 
experience).”149 In the lived context, our life is initially an 
inherited existing-in-the-world and is not a primal existence, that 
is, an uninterpreted existence. We are born into an existence as 
previously constructed by the norms of our cultural and social 
environment. Richard Tarnas sees our conscious awareness of 
this previous construction as a positive opportunity for creativity 
in the postmodern context. He writes:  
This awareness has not only affected the postmodern 
approach to past cultural world views and the history of 
changing scientific theories, but has also influenced the 
postmodern self-understanding itself, encouraging a more 
sympathetic attitude toward repressed or unorthodox 
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perspectives and a more self-critical view of currently 
established ones.150  
Much contemporary Western thinking originates within 
an artificially schematized context. Thomas Torrance writes that, 
in Western development, “human experience was torn away 
from its ontological roots and schematized to the artificially 
contrived patterns of a mechanically conceived universe.”151 In 
this context the natural relationships of the pre-scientific world 
have been replaced by artificial relationships. Such artificial 
relationships are technological alterations in the social 
construction of our original life-world. We experience life as an 
order of objects that have been made objects for us before we 
were born into this life. The counter experience, arising from the 
development of our consciousness, is that a new order of 
relationships arises in a phenomenological epistemology of 
being when “the universe is no longer viewed in a closed 
deterministic way but is viewed as having an open-structured 
nature, which discloses itself to rational enquiry as it really is in 
its systemic relations.”152 In a phenomenological epistemology of 
being the subjective element is, by intent, combined with the 
objective element in the process of understanding. To exclude 
the subjective connection in interpretation would be a 
phenomenological philosophical mistake according to John 
Searle.153 This is not necessarily so in scholastic epistemology. 
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In scholastic epistemology objective reality exists independently 
of subjective connections. 
As a general rule contemporary religious researchers are 
often satisfied with societal explanations of knowledge. 
Phenomenological theologians, however, seek to actualize what 
it means to be through a conscious encounter with another in a 
social construction of some sort. A theological social 
construction involves creative and innovative interchange, either 
reflectively with oneself or with another subject (a person) or 
object (a social construction). However, an “encounter” need not 
be with a known entity. Gordon Kaufman writes: “It is the 
awareness of my being limited that we are here dealing with and 
thus in some sense an actual ‘encounter’ with that which limits 
me” [all Kaufman's italics].154 In a phenomenological 
epistemology of being, social construction discloses to 
consciousness an interpretation which may or may not take 
cognizance of the divine. “That of God” may or may not be 
brought to consciousness as actualized in the knower. Such was 
much early understanding of social construction, presented in 
American academia via social psychology, which deleted any 
reference to that which is divine thus disqualifying its use by 
theologians. Edward Ross’s book, Social Psychology: An 
Outline and Source Book, falls within this category. To his 
credit, however, he does offer a useful methodological insight 
and suggests “that social psychology...studies the psychic planes 
and currents that come into existence among men in 
consequence of their association.”155 From the preceding it 
                                                   
154 Gordon Kaufman, “On the Meaning of ‘God’: Transcendence 
without Mythology,” in New Theology No 4, ed. M. E. Marty and D. G. 
Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 82.  
155 Edward Ross, Social Psychology: An Outline and Source Book 
(New York: Macmillan, 1912), vii.  
 67
becomes evident that a phenomenological epistemology of being 
is to be preferred to a theoretical epistemology of knowing.  
 
Social Construction Three: Continual Interpretation, not 
Fixed Interpretation  
 
Below, I explore the shift from fixed (scholastic) to 
continual (phenomenological) interpretation and investigate the 
social construction of theological notions. Within 
phenomenology an evolution from scholastic to “new style” 
interpretation continues to take place. In discussing the change 
from a speculative interpretation of theory to a 
phenomenological approach to the life-world, Edmund Husserl 
writes: “Clearly, only through a total change of the natural 
attitude, such that we no longer live, as heretofore, as human 
beings within natural existence, constantly effecting the validity 
of the pregiven world; rather, we must constantly deny ourselves 
this” [Husserl’s italics].156 “The ‘new style’ phenomenological 
research in religion interprets ‘meaning’ in terms of connections 
existing between concrete people and those data which have a 
religious significance for them,” writes a theological 
researcher.157 In existential theology one must consider a 
multitude of concepts, subjectively formed, that are extremely 
diverse in their meaning “so that the questions of agreement, 
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disagreement, and truth can be formulated.”158 To engage in 
existential interpretation is a challenging task. Don Ihde offers 
this advice to meet this challenge. 
When one first learns a discipline, one must also learn a 
‘tribal language.’ In philosophy, those who read Kant for 
the first time, or Leibniz, or even Nietzsche, may find 
words being used in a different and often technical 
way....But if a discipline is to be mastered, the technical 
language simply must be learned. That is as true of 
sciences, logic, alternate styles of philosophy as it is of 
phenomenology.159  
The movement from fixed to continual interpretation 
within western theological methodology, which has been a long-
standing characteristic of Eastern theological methodology, 
arises partly from the attempts at reconciling contemporary 
interpretation and traditional understanding. Existential 
interpretation in theology is a methodological enquiry which 
discloses spiritual values arising from a moment of faith. “God is 
the direct object of faith, and faith is the direct object of 
theology. Faith as the object of theology may be studied from the 
[historical] sources and the contemporary experience of faith.”160 
These historical sources may be understood as the body of 
theological thought, characteristic of the Patristic Age, to which 
we relate in a community of belief. Heinrich Ott, from the 
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perspective of an ecumenical inquiry into the disclosure of 
spiritual values, writes: 
Again, although the Roman Catholic Church cannot alter 
the dogmas which it has defined in virtue of its teaching 
office, yet it in no way knows what future formulations 
will appear as a result of the process of understanding and 
interpretation. That someday a future pope will 
authoritatively interpret or reformulate one or another of 
the doctrinal teachings that have divided the churches, 
e.g., the doctrine of papal infallibility, in such a way that it 
could be acceptable to us Protestants, upon that rests a 
genuine ecumenical hope.161 
For doctrinal teaching to be reformulated, a pope would 
need to abandon the scholastic tradition in favour of a 
phenomenological understanding. This leads me to suggest that 
the Orthodox theological social construction of texts, and their 
contexts, rests on such a moment of faith which remains open to 
continual interpretation which may not be the case with Roman 
theological social construction.  
Earlier evolutionary shifts occurred when the 
interpretation of the universe, based on the thought of Ptolemy 
(367-285 BCE), changed to an interpretation based on the 
thought of Copernicus (1473-1543), and again with Newton 
(1642-1727). According to David Carr, Edmund Husserl 
recognized a similar evolutionary shift occurring when Greek 
thinking developed from a natural attitude, that is, one prior to 
critical reflection, to a theoretical attitude introduced about the 
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time of Socrates (469-399 BCE).162 In the ancient Hellenistic 
perspective of interpretation the gods were ultimately 
responsible for everything, but not so today. Further, today, we 
are likely to hold a view opposed to Newtonian principles and 
hold a view based on a phenomenological theology. According 
to one theologian speaking of this shift: “Even God's position 
was influenced by this philosophy: He was not responsible for 
everything anymore” [italics mine].163 That God is not 
responsible for everything anymore is an innovation in Western 
theological thought. In the East, however, such an attitude never 
was dominant. The Fathers never made God responsible for the 
believer’s life. For the West, this is a significant development 
because persons may now recognize themselves as co-
responsible agents, as well as, being co-creators of their life-
world. Such recognition was always possible within Patristic 
theology. Being co-responsible agents and co-creators is an 
initial stage within a process of Christ-like perfection leading the 
faithful ultimately to participation in the divine being. In a 
scholastic approach this understanding is not possible. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty observes: “The Catholic critics wish for things to 
reveal a God-directed orientation of the world and wish for man 
- like things - to be nothing but a nature heading toward its 
perfection.”164 Co-responsibility and co-creativity are disclosed 
in an existential interpretation of the life-world. The insight of 
the apostle Paul is an example of such an existential 
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interpretation. In his speech at the Areopagus, Paul hints at a 
divine presence immanently constituting our being. “Though 
indeed he is not far from each one of us. For ‘In him we live and 
move and have our being’; as even some of your own poets have 
said ‘For we too are his offspring.’”165 
Charles Darwin introduced evolutionary ideas and 
Immanuel Kant introduced new philosophical ideas into western 
thought. According to Emil Brunner: “It was not the origin of the 
species as a scientific theory of the genesis of the forms of life, 
but the inclusion of man in the biological process of evolution, 
and the explanation of human forms of life in terms of biological 
laws of growth, which made Darwin’s theory a force in the life 
of our day.”166 According to Franklin Baumer: “On the theory of 
knowledge [Kant] worked out, God became ‘speculatively 
unknowable.’ Thus, neither philosophy nor science any longer 
led to God, as they had done in the days of Descartes, Newton 
and Christian Wolff.”167 Further, reflecting contemporary 
thinking, one theologian identifies evolution as part of the New 
Age consciousness which, as Edward Moore believes, is “a sort 
of New Age religiosity that is as far afield from genuine 
religious feeling as one can possibly get.”168 However, this New 
Age understanding of evolution is not to be identified with 
evolution in the Darwinian sense, “but it should be noted that in 
contrast to Darwinian theory, New Age evolutionists commonly 
introduce some integrating and teleological force of ‘Mind’ or 
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‘Intention’.”169 These interpretations of Darwin, Kant and Steyn 
depart from the conventional and previously accepted 
understanding of their socially constructed worlds. Darwin’s 
evolutionary thought introduced “change” as natural and part of 
the developmental process, and “becoming” as intrinsic to 
human evolutionary development. Edmund Husserl identifies 
this phenomenon of change as the ‘Heraclitean flux,’ and he 
says:  
We wish, then, to consider the surrounding life-world 
concretely, in its neglected relativity and according to all 
the manners of relativity belonging essentially to it...as 
they give themselves to us at first in straightforward 
experience....Our exclusive task shall be to comprehend 
precisely this style, precisely this whole merely subjective 
and apparently incomprehensible ‘Heraclitean flux’” 
[Husserl’s italics].170  
About such creative thinking Richard Tarnas writes:  
We see why such geniuses regularly experience their 
intellectual breakthrough as a profound illumination, a 
revelation of the divine creative principle itself, as with 
Newton's exclamation to God, “I think Thy thoughts after 
Thee!” For the human mind is following the numinous 
archetypal path that is unfolding from within it.171  
Darwinian and Kantian thought structures, I suggest, form part 
of the archetypal path and in Carl Jung’s sense “are transmitted 
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as possibilities, determining our behaviour” but not decidedly 
so.172 Kant's creative thinking introduced a new philosophical 
understanding about intelligible categories. They exist but are 
not perceptible. However, neither a Cartesian, nor a Newtonian, 
nor a Kantian understanding of the universe brings western 
interpretation nearer to certitude. None of these understandings 
provides a final resolution to existential theological problems. 
Therefore, theologians, both Western and Orthodox, continue to 
look for new interpretations in seeking answers to their 
questions. This dissertation aids in that quest. 
Philosophical understanding and theological 
interpretation undergo an aggiornamento, or better, a 
ressourcement, when understood from a phenomenological 
perspective and become disengaged from a culture that no longer 
exists. It is generally understood, particularly among Roman 
Catholics, that aggiornamento began with Pope John XXIII. 
However, as an ecumenical theologian notes:  
It is no belittlement of Pope John to suggest that he was 
not the creator of this renewal movement, which already 
existed before his pontificate; that what he did was to 
welcome and give its name (aggiornamento) and aim to 
the whole movement, to extend to it the full sympathy and 
encouragement of his person and of his office and to 
emphasize its implications for Christian unity.173  
Tracey Rowland notes that ressourcement seeks to retrieve 
“the treasury of Patristic thought,” whereas, aggiornamento, 
connotes an “updating to meet the requirements of some external 
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standard.”174 The former, ressourcement, belongs to 
phenomenological philosophy and the latter, aggiornamento, to 
scholastic philosophy. Ressourcement, as a liberating 
philosophical approach, reveals individual persons as 
participants, that is, co-creators within and of their Lebenswelt. 
Interestingly, especially in light of contemporary ecological 
thinking, Paul Tillich does not seem to limit this co-creativity to 
human beings but, by a different term, predicates it of non-
human beings: 
I mean that, despite human weaknesses, there is something 
in man that God did not want to destroy....God took a risk, 
and we must take a risk. He took a risk in permitting man 
to reach his full humanity....I use the word spontaneity 
here for animals and plants, and probably even 
molecules,...but I cannot describe this process fully. I 
learned the fact from biologists and neurologists.175 
The co-participation in divine creativity by all creatures is the 
‘risk’ God took, which anticipates possible failure. 
Our human nature demands that we respond. We cannot 
not act. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka writes “man’s freedom is 
basically responsibility for his realization; this responsibility is, 
however, not only to himself for his own strict individuality but 
to all men” [Tymieniecka’s italics].176 Continual interpretation, 
or evolution in methodology, does not occur simply for novelty’s 
sake, as if contemporary thought were merely tired of classical 
expression. Rather, continual interpretation of contemporary 
                                                   
174 Tracey Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after 
Vatican II (London: Routledge, 2003), 7/19.  
175 Paul Tillich, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (New York: 
Harper, 1965), 184.  
176 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Phenomenology and Science in 
Contemporary European Thought (New York: Noonday, 1962), 181.  
 75
theological thought seeks new meaning out of religious 
experience and Tradition. Andrew Walker observes that 
“spirituality is something that we have to rediscover in every 
generation, in order that we remain prophets in fact and not 
merely in principle; that we are renewers of Tradition and 
renewed by it, and not merely rehearsers of it.”177 According to 
Langdon Gilkey continual interpretation occurs with “a sense of 
the holy or sacred as the prior condition for the meaningfulness 
of any form of theology” [Gilkey’s italics].178 
Do some Orthodox theologians understand themselves 
as co-responsible agents seeking a method of textual 
interpretation and social construction which will express their 
participatory role in the religious interpretation of the life-world? 
This is a contemporary question. Our inherited theological 
understanding, either of the Western or Patristic traditions, is not 
false. Rather, it is inadequate for the contemporary context. 
Reinforcing the idea that Greek understanding is not error, 
Edmund Husserl writes: “To express it more fully: the historical 
surrounding world of the Greeks is not the objective world in our 
sense but rather their ‘world-representation,’ i.e., their own 
subjective validity with all the actualities which are valid for 
them within it, including, for example, gods, demons, etc.”179 In 
western theological thinking, debate has moved from the 
question of the structure of religious language (a scholastic 
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issue) to “the more radical question of its possibility as a mode 
of meaningful discourse” (an existential issue) in which the 
interpreter is part of the interpretation.180 The interpreter being 
part of the interpretation introduces changes into the meaning of 
theological social constructions. Unlike scholastic thinking the 
Patristic tradition holds that a meaningful discourse involves the 
interpreter as part of the interpretation. 
In an article entitled ‘Renewal of the Doctrine of Man,’ 
Charles Möeller writes of existential theological interpretive 
structures that “it is not by escaping from the real weight of these 
structures that we will be saved, but through them, by accepting 
our condition; not by trying to outstrip time but by living the 
theologia crucis” [theological crux].181 In existential 
interpretation the social construction of the Christian’s life-world 
is the theologia crucis in which religious matters must be 
engaged. For most of us living in the Christian West, modernity 
is the context of the theologia crucis, and according to Jurgen 
Habermas , “modernity can and will no longer borrow the 
criteria...from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to 
create its normativity out of itself ” [Habermas’s italics].182 In an 
existential interpretation of the theologia crucis, theology 
becomes “fundamentally an activity of construction (and 
reconstruction) not description or exposition, as it has ordinarily 
been understood in the past.”183 A phenomenological 
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methodology does disclose something new and does not simply 
present variations of previous interpretations. What is new is the 
dialectical interpretation of relationships. New dialectical 
interpretations raise new questions requiring further innovative 
resolutions. According to Gary Madison “New meanings are 
simply new ways of relating to things by means of new or 
unusual usages of words (or their semiotic equivalent in other 
expressive media),” which, I suggest, occurs in the social 
construction of experience [Madison's italics].184  
Interpretation of relationships is a continual action of the 
self-conscious subject, that is, of the person who is capable of 
consciously effecting future interpretation. On future 
understanding there seems to be an area common to the classical 
philosophical tradition and phenomenological understanding. 
Eulalio Baltazar writes: “In the whole Greek tradition of 
philosophy, the present is the region of being; the future is non-
being….”185 Meaning is actualized in the present moment 
through eidetic ontological social construction. This is an 
evolutionary development away from scholastic understanding in 
which the subject defines itself according to the mind of another 
from outside of the subject. In traditional Western theology the 
definition of the subject originates in the mind of God and is to 
conform to the mind of God. In a phenomenological 
understanding, or in the Patristic way of thinking, the subject is 
to actualize itself within an existential unity in the presence of 
the self with another, that is, in a relationship that admits no 
dichotomy between itself and the other. 
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We seek to interpret our experience in a language 
adapted to the world in which we live, according to Langdon 
Gilkey and, indeed, “we cannot legitimately and meaningfully 
conceive except in terms of the world we inhabit” [Gilkey’s 
italics].186 Specific cultures provide the context in which 
existential interpretation is continually formulated and 
reformulated. History shows that those methodologies or 
interpretations that die out have not exhausted their meaning. 
Rather, other methodologies which are more suitably adapted to 
a specific cultural interpretation have become accepted. As an 
example, Raymond Young, in his research shows how unsuitable 
psychotherapeutic methodologies have been replaced by 
culturally appropriate ones.187 Yet in theology, there is still no 
hermeneutic, no clear method, no set of rules to secure a definite 
interpretation of religious experience. Peter Berger suggests that 
“theological thought should follow an inductive approach...that 
begins with ordinary human experience...and moves on from 
there to religious affirmations about the nature of reality.”188 A 
cyclic, or better, a spiral, manner of thinking obtains in the 
phenomenological approach. This activity is the hermeneutical 
circle.189 That which is new is brought to consciousness not from 
elsewhere, that is, theoretically, but, phenomenologically, that is, 
brought to consciousness from the immediate context of the 
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lifeworld. Non-scholastic research procedures make conclusions 
on the basis of what the data dictate. Influenced by Hans Frei, 
Avery Dulles writes of narrative interpretation: “Interpretation 
must appropriate the narrative in its own right and not pose 
questions that arise out of a different horizon.”190 Inter alia, 
phenomenological interpretation must address social 
construction existentially in its own right, and not pose questions 
from another horizon. 
Phenomenological theological interpretation gives rise to 
an ecclesial, as opposed to an ecclesiastical, tradition. I do not 
say that an ecclesial tradition is to be understood as exclusive of, 
or as exhaustive of, or co-extensive with, a canonical social 
structure, that is, a de jure structure that characterizes the 
ecclesiastical tradition. A traditionally normative canonical 
social structure is, however, characteristic of an ecclesial 
tradition. In the modern context and experience a de jure social 
construction is not the only structure for an ecclesial tradition. In 
other words, the social construction of the believing community, 
the Church, is broader than her canons and her life extends 
beyond her canons. Johaan Wolfaardt, quoted by D M 
Ackermann, maintains that “communicative actions which 
mediate the Christian faith outside the traditional church 
framework can also become objects of study” [my italics].191 
Further, Langdon Gilkey stresses the religious aspect of secular 
experience, or experience outside the traditional Church, in one 
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of his books.192 Similarly, Richard Shaull does not conceive a 
sharp distinction between a believing community and the public 
forum. Although admitting that God may be encountered outside 
the visible boundaries of the church, he goes on to write: “I have 
a certain suspicion that this conception [the public forum] of the 
Church, with all its richness and power, does not do justice to the 
New Testament witness regarding the nature of the Church.”193 
In effect, an ecclesial tradition must be recognized as broader 
than an ecclesiastical tradition, for its social construction to be 
proper to Orthodoxy. To preempt any allegation of equating the 
sacred and the secular perspective, Paul Ricoeur confesses: “In 
brief, the church is, for me, the place where I can most 
authentically live the dialectic between conviction and 
responsibility.”194 For Ricoeur the believing community is 
necessary but its socially constructed form appears not to be 
predetermined. Within phenomenological theological 
understanding the social construction of the ecclesial community 
is subject to continual actualization but not fossilized canonical 
form. However, regardless of how the ecclesial community is 
constructed both, scholastic and phenomenological models, 
“structure human experience and give that experience coherence, 
meaning and healing.”195 This coherence, meaning and healing, 
which is a continual activity, is more suitable to Orthodox and 
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The two phenomenological case studies of theological texts, 
(ecological manuscripts and canon law), undertaken below are 
based on principles discussed in Part One. In the following study 
I apply to these theological texts, and their socially constructed 
contexts, the four prerequisite conditions that Samuel Ijsseling 
lists as necessary before phenomenological literary research 
begins. Given that literary texts are products of their respective 
communities the prerequisites for studying these texts are, inter 
alia, common to those used for studying the social constructions 
of their communities of origin. In this case I make an 
interpretation of the texts, and their context, from within an 
holistic perspective.196 The first prerequisite for studying social 
constructions, and their texts, is that the “problematic is always 
presented to us from the midst of a tradition...necessarily 
                                                   
196 While not discussing the difference in spelling between 
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‘mediated’ by a canon of actually present works.”197 The second 
prerequisite is that theological social constructions, and their 
texts, are presented such that we are to interpret them 
dialectically. “We are able to speak about them, and they, too, 
have something to say to us” (Ijsseling 1981:179). The third 
prerequisite I acknowledge with reservation. I suspect it belongs 
more properly to theoretical interpretation than to 
phenomenological interpretation. It is that theological social 
constructions, and their contexts, are revelatory of a certain 
“being-in-their own-right.” If social construction reveals an 
object possessing “being-in-its-own right” this suggests that 
theological social constructions exist and operate independently 
of their origin. In this aspect of Ijsseling's understanding, it 
seems to me that theological social constructions would. function 
more like signs, a Latin understanding, than symbols, an Eastern 
understanding. Signs function to engender stability of perception 
but this is not the case with symbols or any written texts I 
suggest. Plato, according to Edward Moore, held a similar 
understanding with respect to written dialogues.198 I render 
symbol in the sense understood within the Eastern tradition 
where the Creeds, and the local and ecumenical synods, are 
symbols of faith. Symbols contrast with signs which signify 
some thing or objective reality. Theological social constructions, 
and their contexts, within Ijsseling’s perspective have “a certain 
aseitas; they lead a life of their own, independent of their origin, 
and they have their own effectivity or operativity” (Ijsseling 
1981:180). The fourth prerequisite concerns the acceptance of 
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authorship. Like the texts they produce, social constructions do 
not have a single author, although they often have a single 
architect. Within literary criticism it is recognized that the author 
of a text is not necessarily the redactor of the text. Texts, in fact, 
have many authors (Ijsseling 1981:182). These prerequisites may 
be applied in the understanding of social constructions within 
Orthodox theology. This is demonstrated within an ecclesial 
tradition where social construction expresses a collective belief. 
Samuel Ijsseling (1981:180) reminds us that “a text never has a 
single father or a single origin....The genealogy of a text is an 
extremely complex affair.” So it is with social construction 
within an ecclesial tradition. 
Not all researchers agree with Ijsseling’s third 
prerequisite being an objective sign. Allan Bloom writes that 
phenomenological interpretation belongs to the 
Deconstructionist School which suppresses reason and denies the 
possibility of objective truth. He notes that “the interpreter’s 
creative activity [or social construction] is more important than 
the text; there is no text, only interpretation [by] the subjective, 
creative selves of these interpreters, who say that there is both no 
text and no reality to which the texts refer.199 Further, another 
author disagrees with Samuel Ijsseling’s third prerequisite as 
outlined above. A literary work, he states, “differs from the 
absolute and ideal object by its modus existentiæ, that is, 
heteronomy, derivation and contingency. It does not possess an 
essence of its own.”200 In this dissertation I follow Harold 
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Linstone’s and Murray Turoff’s understanding of method and 
Samuel Ijsseling’s understanding of context which present 
guideposts for the practical investigation of ecological theology 
and canon law.201  
Mario Valdés suggests four possible questions to 
investigate in phenomenological textual criticism, which may be 
applied to Orthodox theological social construction.  
- How does the text operate?  
- What does the text speak about?  
- What does the text say to me?  
- How have I read the text?202  
The structural features of a classical interpretation are not the 
same as the structural features of an existential interpretation. 
This difference in structural features is due to a differing 
ontological experience. Traditionally structured texts, and their 
socially constructed contexts, reflect a scholastic and fixed 
ontology, whereas existentially structured texts, and their 
socially constructed contexts, reflect an existential dynamic 
ontology. Whether the theological texts, and their social 
constructions, refer to something real and external is not the 
primary issue. The primary issue is to interpret what is believed 
as expressed in the texts, or in social constructions, in terms of 
Valdés’s second question: “What does the text speak about?” 
A phenomenological approach to the texts, and their 
social constructions, discloses the convictions of individuals 
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within a believing community and the convictions of the 
community itself as to what these foci speak about. The 
traditional formula, lex orandi, lex credendi (the law of prayer is 
the law of belief), may be existentially re-interpreted as: “What 
is believed is what is socially constructed.” From this perspective 
beliefs are proper to an existential investigation as social 
construction is proper to phenomenological investigation.  
 
FIRST CASE STUDY: ECOLOGICAL THEOLOGY 
 
Ecological Theology: As an Orthodox 
Phenomenological Social Construction  
 
Without question the Fathers did not think in modern 
terms of “ecology” and “environment” and write accordingly, 
neither did the ancient Greek philosophers think this way. This 
should not be surprising. Laura Westra and Thomas Robinson 
have outlined a non-phenomenological philosophical approach in 
addressing ecological issues. However, when applying Greek 
philosophical thought to contemporary ecological problems they 
write that “We should also feel free to speculate whether, had 
they been faced with our problems (problems that clearly had no 
existence during their lifetimes), anything present in their 
thought might not suggest a positive, useful ‘new’ approach.”203 
In other words a Hellenic philosophical system need not be a 
closed system. It may contain the seeds of new ideas thus 
preventing the illusion of a philosophical stability of ideas as was 
noted earlier. We know that the Fathers did write about a divine-
human relationships which we may envision as social 
                                                   
203 Laura Westra and Thomas Robinson, The Greeks and the 
Environment (Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, MD: 1997), 4.  
 87
constructions arising out of their experience of the ecclesial 
community. These relationships, as a social constructions, in 
Western culture have become intellectualized such that any 
spiritual dynamic in this world has been diminished by the 
introduction of an artificial dichotomy within the divine-human 
relationship. Theological thought, both Eastern (Patristic) and 
Western (scholastic), is grappling with the ecological crisis. The 
significance of this crisis may be better understood through a 
phenomenological social construction rather than from a 
scholastic social construction. A Western thinker, with 
sympathies for Patristic thought, Henryk Skolimowski, explored 
the ecological crisis and wrote: “The act of perception [of the 
divine-human relationship] is unitary, holistic, and complete; its 
intellectual deciphering is partial and abstract, always a 
contrived process.”204 These words apply within the Patristic 
tradition. In the Patristic tradition the continuing experience of 
the Church is the primary locus in which to be guided by the 
presence of the Holy Spirit. In this way the faithful will make the 
correct decisions about their ecological future. Ironically, as 
Elizabeth Theokritoff, notes the Church is often the last place 
most people look for spiritual direction.205 
Traditional humanism bases itself on the Promethian 
myth which insists on the independence and the greatness of 
humanity and the rejection of a spiritual component. In this 
conception humanity, in opposition to divinity, may appropriate 
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nature for its purposes and its needs. Such an attitude toward 
ecological social construction is not in keeping with Orthodox 
theological thinking. Orthodox theological thinking considers the 
person as a unitary partner with nature and the environment. In 
short Orthodox ecological theology presupposes an ecological 
humanitarianism, not ecological humanism. John Zizioulas sees 
the ecological problem as resulting from secular humanism that 
divides creator and creation. He says that “when we come to the 
ecological problem, we see that its roots lie in the fact that 
human beings have separated themselves from the rest of 
creation.”206 Recall that humanitarianism seeks to promote 
human welfare, whereas, humanism is a non-religious 
philosophy based on secular values. Orthodox ecological 
theology is not simply a new label invented to protect nature and 
its resources. Orthodox ecological theology is a 
phenomenological social construction and implies a fundamental 
relationship to the environment along with our place in it and 
this requires the proper social construction of relationships on 
our part. This ecological theology reflects a unitary vision which 
considers theological interpretation and humanity in relation to 
each other. In short, Orthodox ecological theology reflects an 
enlarged vision of the evolving environment which recognizes 
no conflict between the Church and science. This enlarged vision 
is tantamount to a new vision and has been characteristic of 
Orthodox theology for some time, Zizioulas notes.  
What we need is a new attitude, a new mentality, a new 
ethos, and this can be created with the help of the Church. 
This has happened throughout the centuries, at least in the 
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Orthodox Church, where the faithful were brought up on 
fasting, on respecting the material world and 
acknowledging through the liturgy that creation belongs to 
God.207  
The age which is approaching is the age of management 
of our scientific abilities in concert with our divine ends. As 
human inhabitants of the earth we have choose between two 
competing options. One option is to be “custodians of the past” 
and the second is to be “architects of the future.” From our place 
within the Church, or the ecclesial community, we are to work 
with science to transform our environment. That is, create social 
constructions that properly reflect the divine-human relationship. 
In this connection, Pope John Paul II made a significant 
observation, applicable to both the Western and Patristic 
experience, in an address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences 
in 1996. The “fruitfulness of frank dialogue” will arise from 
dialogue between the Church and science and not religion and 
science as it is often understood, the Pope noted.  
Much in our Western culture persuades us that the 
universe is a hostile and solitary place. This is the general view 
of the universe out of which many of our contemporary 
philosophical questions are formed. John Chrssavgis writes, 
concerning the ecological crisis, that 
it is a crisis concerning the way we perceive reality, the 
way we imagine or image our world. We are treating our 
environment, our planet, in an inhuman, Godforsaken 
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manner – precisely because we see it in this way, precisely 
because we see ourselves in this way.208  
But this is not the Orthodox view of the structure of the universe 
which is a predominately theological view, not a philosophical 
view. Orthodox ecological theology presents a countercultural 
experience, as it were, to the Western cultural tradition by 
reconciling the human system of values within a humanitarian 
vision of the universe. The humanitarian vision and the divine 
mind are complementary as understood in the traditional and 
pre-technological cultures. Elias Economou has remarked that, 
strictly speaking, the ecological crisis is not a question of our 
relationship to nature alone but a question of the relationship to 
the Creator along with God’s purpose in creating the world.209 
This understanding reflects a socially constructed set of 
relationships within our system of human values which includes 
the ethical codes of civilization, and other faiths, so that the 
universe is seen as a harmonious place favourable, not hostile, to 
the efforts of divine-human cooperation. 
Cultures and traditions socially construct themselves 
based on their spiritual inheritance. Social construction arising 
out of an un-inherited culture or tradition may easily become an 
illusion lacking a historical critique and thus not truly reflect 
reality. Upon first consideration this position may appear to 
contradict that of Habermas’s observation noted above, that is, as 
moderns we must create our norms out of our experience, not the 
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inherited concepts of the past. To prevent misunderstanding I 
follow Patrick Henry Reardon’s well-articulated understanding 
of the relationship between culture and tradition within Orthodox 
theology.210 According to him, social construction within 
tradition and culture is not question of resuscitating novel ideas 
that worked in the past, but, rather it is a question of proposing 
new social constructions appropriate to the materials of our 
moral and spiritual inheritances. To create norms from our 
experience is not that of the “Lazarus effect” as some might 
suspect, that is, a resuscitation to the “old” life. Rather, for 
theologians to create norms out of their experience, individual 
and collective, is the “Christian effect,” a resurrection to the 
“new” life. The ancient Greeks were highly individualistic in 
their thinking but they never developed a doctrine of 
individualism such is as found in the contemporary Western 
culture. The inordinate philosophical understanding of the 
individual prevalent in the West is due to a loss of the perception 
of a divine-human relationship. Because this intrinsic spiritual 
relationship is rejected technical values become more and more 
dominant. Further, technological values become the exclusive 
norm of international goals to which developing cultures aspire. 
Orthodox theological social construction transcends the 
limitations of a technological system. A purely humanistic and 
scientific cosmology, that reflects only a technological social 
construction, that excludes divinity in its composition, is 
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deficient and inimical to human beings, and is not reflective of 
an Orthodox social construction. 
Let us not continue with the illusion that a scientific 
vision will be a safe refuge for us and provide an opportunity to 
satisfy all our temporal needs. The pursuit of power, material 
values, consumer values and similar ideologies is based on a 
conception of the universe as a temporal corporation, not as an 
eternal Holy Temple wherein God resides. The danger here is 
that a temporal corporation mentality may allow for the 
construction of an environmental habitat suitable for secular-
minded humans with no appreciation of an eternal spirituality. 
There are many systems of knowledge, but none can contain the 
totality, nor complexity, of the universe in its existential 
construction of community. The Orthodox theological view is 
opposed to any social construction that lacks an eternal 
spirituality and strives to maintain the experience of the universe 
as a Holy Temple. In conformity with this tradition, Section 
XIII, “The Church and Ecological Problems”, a statement in The 
Orthodox Church in Society: The Basis of the Social Contract of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, reads:  
The anthropogenic background of ecological problems 
shows that we tend to change the world around us in 
accordance with our own inner world; therefore, the 
transformation of nature should begin with the 
transformation of the soul. According the Maxim the 
Confessor, man can turn the earth into paradise only if he 
carried paradise in himself.211  
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The divine-human universe unfolds in a process of 
continual transcendence of which we are necessarily a part. In 
this divine-human universe human values govern inter-human 
relations, our social constructions, as well as those values 
between humanity and all life, temporal and divine. In such an 
understanding of the universe, humanity appears as a part and an 
extension of the evolutionary process. The evolving universe 
allows us to recognize a development within the sacredness of 
humanity. The development of sacredness frees humanity from 
captivity by a hostile environment. Our understanding of an 
evolutionary sacredness arises out of the experience of holiness, 
and allows humanity to transcend that nihilism and moral 
relativism, characteristic of Western philosophy, which has no 
foundation in Orthodox theological thinking. That which is 
sacred in this world presents itself in the following ways within 
Orthodox theology: the necessity of transcendence, the 
celebration of life, the necessity of protecting and of the valuing 
of the living environment around us. Sacred social construction 
within Orthodoxy is founded on these experiences. In contrast, 
the culture of technology, which is not sacred, is void of 
transcendence, emptied of celebration of life and of the valuing 
of the environment. A technological imperative dominates in a 
culture which has reversed its anthropological thinking in which 
machines dictate modes of human behaviour. An example of this 
reversal in modern literature, I suggest, is the theme reflected in 
the futuristic novel, 2001 Space Odyssey, in which HAL, the 
computerized machine, became, to all intents and purposes, 
human.212 Today, humans face the opposite danger within the 
global ecological crisis. Humans are becoming like the machines 
they create. 
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The unique, sacred, evolutionary, and divine-human 
social construction, or, which is the same thing, creation, opens 
us to transcendence and to personal sanctification such that we 
grow in the divine life. To the degree that we sacrifice ourselves, 
consciously or unconsciously, we are transformed into 
instruments to affect other purposes in life. In Christian 
cosmology every thing is God’s property. Such a cosmology 
constitutes an environment within which to construct a house for 
the divine-human interaction which generates ethical principles 
for an authentic social construction. The motive for mere, and 
some would argue inauthentic, technological progress is 
industrial and economic efficiency. However, as human beings, 
there is “that of God” in us and all of us must play our part on 
the evolutionary stage – to paraphrase William Shakespeare.213 
As a social construction intended for human spiritual perfection, 
Orthodoxy performs a positive role on I recall, when the movie 
was first released, it was pointed out that the acronym HAL, 
reads IBM, when the immediately subsequent letters are 
combined. the world’s stage. Overwhelmed by material progress, 
we often forget that humans constitute a holy and wholesome 
divine-human presence within Orthodoxy. The ecological 
preservation of life is one action by which Orthodox Christians 
can take responsibility, as partners with God, in a divine social 
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The Phenomenological Stance as Pre-requisite to 
Ecological Theology  
 
Ecological theology invites us to discover the 
relationships of human life within the universe. Our motivation 
in this discovery is often mistakenly focused on a merely 
scientific vision of the world, and on the less than satisfactory 
social constructions created by this vision. Scientific 
understanding has become so subtle and complex in articulating 
human relationships that we are often impeded in achieving any 
humanitarian advancement and thus fall back on unrealistic 
philosophical positions. 
An alternate understanding to the scientific one is 
required. Orthodox ecological theology requires an alternative 
theologica ancillae to replace the scholastic Aristotelian one. 
The alternative is a phenomenological epistemological 
understanding which must become the way of knowing, where 
existential being, not metaphysical theory, is the foundation of 
the divine-human relationships. Such a phenomenological stance 
not only changes our understanding of technology, our economy 
and our way of life, but also changes our ethics and set of 
normative values. The movement away from the Aristotelian-
derived system of thinking, which has dominated the West, has 
been thoroughly addressed by Leslie Dewart. He describes this 
movement positively as the conscious creation of the future of 
belief.214 It is not possible any longer to refer to the positivism of 
the Western scientific spirit such as it was conceived in the 17th 
century. This view is now inadequate. A phenomenological 
understanding of interdependent relationships that occur in the 
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divine-human cosmos presents a better stance by which to face 
our problems of individual alienation, social destruction, 
environmental crises and research into ecological relationships. 
Western philosophy makes a distinction between 
knowledge and values. Their original unity, as understood in 
Orthodox Christian theology, has been intellectually and 
artificially separated within the Western tradition. As a result, 
two different thinking processes have developed. One is the 
investigation into the physical world by scientific thinkers open 
to transcendental values and the other is one that neglects 
spiritual or divine values. I have noted above, however, that the 
prescientific thinking process retains spiritual or divine values. 
The separation based on scientific/technological logic is 
misleading because, as humans in the divine-human cosmos, we 
are not engaged in two processes. Rather, we are engaged in one 
phenomenological stance with two differing perspectives. 
Failure to appreciate the integral unity of the phenomenological 
stance has resulted in many Western philosophical and scientific 
thinkers wrongly elevating scientific facts to an autonomous or 
divine-like level. Pope Pius XII, in his Encyclical Summi 
Pontificatus (October 20, 1939), hinted at this development 
when he asked the question as to what age, other than ours, in 
spite of its technological progress has been so deeply tormented 
by a spiritual poverty? His answer includes the observation that 
this emptiness, or spiritual poverty, generates a kind of 
hatefulness which leads humanity to become its own judge at the 
expense of the Supreme Judge. The Pope wrote:  
When God is hated, every basis of morality is 
undermined: the voice of conscience is stilled or at any 
rate grows very faint, that voice which teaches even to the 
illiterate and to the uncivilized tribes what is good and 
what is bad, what lawful, what forbidden, and makes men 
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feel themselves responsible for their actions to a Supreme 
Judge.215 
In the 18th century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
Immanuel Kant defended, each in their way, the integrity of their 
world against an intrusion of a mechanical vision with its 
empiricism causing an artificial and fragmented world 
dominated by science. This fragmented world, in turn, led to 
individual and social alienation. Scientific empiricism put the 
emphasis on the “best” of possible worlds while forgetting 
traditional spiritual values. One the positive side, philosophers 
and theologians note that moral knowledge is not able to destroy 
the physical world. On the negative side, however, neglecting 
moral knowledge gives power to human destructive choices. 
Plato, Copernicus and St Augustine, all considered 
knowledge not as a reserve of information stored in the memory 
but as an intrinsic part of the human being. The Orthodox way of 
thinking is sympathetic to this understanding. But in the West 
this unity has been de-constructed. In many cases knowledge has 
become nothing more than a tool intended for some specific task. 
Understood this way, knowledge becomes pure information and 
subsequently translated into bits of information which tend to 
depersonalize, mechanize and ultimately computerize the 
knower. Ultimately such intellectual alienation evolves into 
human alienation. Thus, individuals become alienated from 
divine knowledge and values. A cause of such alienation is an 
erroneous conception of the universe as separated and divided. 
Through this separation and division of knowledge in the 
knower, humanity itself becomes potentiality divided. This 
current vision, which remains dominant in the West, is artificial. 
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To recover our spiritual health and re-constitute our divided 
mind it is necessary for Western theologians to regain certain 
fundamental premises that have been known to Orthodox 
thinkers throughout the ages. This re-constituting 
phenomenological stance serves, in fact, as a pre-requisite for 
Western and Orthodox ecological understanding. 
For Westerners to regain these fundamental premises, 
they have to realize first of all that personal knowledge is an 
important characteristic of the divine-human relationship. 
Orthodox theology, aided by a phenomenological understanding, 
is about revisiting the notion of knowledge as articulated by 
Plato, St Augustine and Copernicus. Many philosophers in the 
scholastic tradition have failed to properly realize this ancient 
understanding of knowledge within the contemporary world. 
These philosophers have become filled with “bits” of knowledge 
arising from the process of data processing and, as well, have 
become filled with specific technical knowledge which often is 
inappropriate to the context at hand. This makes our current 
metaphysical understanding a pathological one. Instead of 
enlightening us, knowledge creates confusion, and the 
accumulation of misinformation only aggravates the process of 
alienation. A knowledge that is foreign to the human spirit and to 
the values of human beings can only desensitize and alienate 
those who acquire it. Knowledge that risks de-humanization may 
be appropriate for a world conceived as a factory, but not for a 
world conceived as a Holy Temple. A system which exploits the 
economy, the environment and humanity cannot support 
knowledge that promotes the divine-human relationship. Such an 
exploitive vision transforms knowledge into mere information, 
transforms values into economic products and transforms human 
beings into merely technological experts, all unfit for the divine-
human relationship. 
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Unlike many Orthodox theologians, Western 
philosophers tend more to follow the spirit of their times. In the 
late 18th and early 19th centuries mechanical and technical 
specialization altered Western civilization. As a result, we now 
live in a world where scientific knowledge redefines the 
concepts of nature and ecology. In the Western world we suffer 
from unprecedented social and individual distresses and anxiety. 
Seemingly beneficial technology has served as a crutch and we 
can no longer think or act by ourselves. When contemporary 
non-technological cultures speak about progress, and when we 
speak about the Green Revolution or about the elimination of 
illiteracy in the Third World, we often put faith in Western 
empirical, positivist, and analytical philosophy. We see that all 
economic international dealings are influenced by this western 
philosophical perspective. Even though Western philosophical 
thinking promotes this approach, Orthodox ecological theology 
opposes such activity and works to establish an alternative point 
of view. Orthodox ecological theology becomes a primary and 
proper tool for correct environmental relationships in life. We 
have to abandon the mechanical concept by which the western 
world understands itself and replace it with a much wider and 
richer conception such as is found in a phenomenological 
approach. In short, the spiritually bankrupt humanism of the 
western world needs to be replaced by a phenomenological 
humanitarian social construction of divine-human relationships.  
 
The Message of an Orthodox Ecological Theology  
 
Orthodox ecological theology is focused upon the 
spiritual relationships in life. Further, our preference for these 
relationships need not be justified in the eyes of the non-
believing world. For the Orthodox theologian it is sufficient to 
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provide a witness to the spirituality inherent in life in the 
presence of the non-believer. Orthodox ecological theology 
implies a commitment to human values, to nature, and to life 
itself. Whereas, much of the philosophy studied in contemporary 
Western universities supporting an ecological understanding 
advocates a commitment to objectivism and detachment from a 
spiritual life-style. Orthodox ecological theology does not 
recognize either objectivism or detachment in this manner. 
Objectivism is an invention of the human intellect. It exists 
nowhere in nature. Objectivity, on the other hand, does exist as a 
spiritual, or noetic, quality of the observer and reflects the 
reasoned stance taken by the observer on reflection upon 
experience. Within a phenomenological objectivity, the observer 
is relationally inseparable from the observed and co-constitutes 
existence in a divine-human unity. Theologically, this relational 
unity is to be understood, for the Orthodox, in the sense of the 
mutual Trinitarian observation of the divine persons. A theology 
which avoids the Trinitarian engagement of life reflects a 
process of entropy which ultimately generates death. 
Such a death-wish, as it were, is inherent in Western 
civilization and threatens contemporary theological social 
constructions. Orthodox ecological theology aspires to reverse 
this process. Orthodox ecological theology is spiritually alive, 
while the professional philosophy practiced in the Western-style 
university seems to be dying. Recall that Orthodox ecological 
theology has nothing to do with spiritualism, occult practices or 
religious cults. It is a dynamic and spiritual state of mind which 
is disclosed within a socially constructed ecclesia. In this state of 
dynamic existence we are endowed with grace and experience 
the world as if it were endowed with grace also. The Orthodox 
liturgy is an example, par excellence, of a spiritual experience as 
being endowed with grace. Inspired by the liturgy, Orthodox 
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ecological theology transforms the mere physical perception of 
the environment into a transcendental perception of the 
environment. The liturgy presents a participation in the divine 
life. If we approach the social construction of our environment, 
our cultural and spiritual inheritance, as a divine-human 
phenomenon it becomes evident that the existence of the sacred, 
the divine, is not accidental, but constitutes an experience of a 
graced world. 
As noted above, professional philosophy is dying in the 
universities because it systematically excludes the life of the 
spirit. The nature of humanity is such that we strive to reach out 
within the cosmos but we must realize that our feet are placed 
solidly on earth. Orthodox ecological theology is characterized 
as global, unitary and synthetic while much contemporary 
philosophy supporting theology is national, fragmentary and 
analytical which does not provide a proper support for Orthodox 
theology. Orthodox ecological theology is credible, not because 
of an ability to contain everything and explain everything, but 
because of its insistence on reconciliation both on a physical and 
spiritual level. Orthodox ecological theology reveals that 
theologians have no other choice than to study the world in 
general and its global inter-relationships within a divine-human 
context that constituents all of humanity. Conceived as global 
and synthetic Orthodox ecological theology is integrative, 
hierarchical and normative. Functioning as an integrative and 
normative activity, theological interpretation constitutes a 
community to meet the needs of the individual living within the 
cosmos. 
Orthodox ecological theology is conscious of the 
environment and its life processes, whereas, contemporary 
utilitarian philosophies, with their national interests, tend to 
ignore these life processes. Orthodox ecological theology is not 
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utilitarian and does not limit its activities to the care of natural 
and material resources only. Human spiritual values are part of 
the wider specter of the environment constituting a divine-human 
relationship. Orthodox ecological theology focuses on saving of 
the quality of this divine-human relationship. Western 
philosophy tends to forget this saving quality of the relationship 
at times when it focuses on material progress and development. 
Western philosophy establishes a context which not only 
supports, but encourages inordinate material growth as it 
excludes the spiritual. Orthodox ecological theology is 
essentially concerned with humanitarian and social well-being as 
reflected through the divine Trinitarian relationship. Orthodox 
ecological theology views social construction as proper to human 
life and as an expression of human society. Thus, social 
construction needs to be recognized as a factor bringing about 
human apotheosis (divinization), through relationships patterned 
after the Trinity. 
The task of Orthodox ecological theology today is to 
remove the limitations of utilitarian philosophy where it has 
become an instrument destructive of the environment. Orthodox 
ecological theology abolishes the Cartesian dualism introduced 
into Western experience and considers the divers relationships as 
constituting the same psychic, spiritual, and material entity. 
Humans are not machines that one repairs when out of service. 
Rather, they are persons of living complexity. To maintain 
balance in our conscious social constructions we must remain 
connected with transcendental life of the Trinity. To take care of 
our environmental health and well-being means being 
responsible, in like manner, for the universe which surrounds us. 
This is the essential message of Orthodox ecological 
theology. We can influence every element of our social, 
individual, spiritual, ecological and political life, not separately, 
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but relationally through the Trinitarian pattern. This is in contrast 
to the merely secular life which addresses only a part of our 
being and, erroneously, considers this part as the whole. 
Orthodox ecological theology reveals our permanent relationship 
to the universe which is in perpetual movement as a divine-
human unity. Thus, through changing ourselves and our relations 
with the universe, we participate in its continuous creation.  
 
 
SECOND CASE STUDY: CANON LAW 
 
The Canons: An Orthodox Phenomenological Social 
Construction  
 
The social construction of the meaning of the canons is 
an activity undertaken by the members of the community for the 
benefit of the community. For the purposes of this study the 
canons, which are not all intended to be universally applied, 
include the Holy Canons of the Holy Apostles, the teachings of 
the First Seven Ecumenical Councils and the various canonical 
traditions of the Orthodox eparchies. These I present as examples 
of the theological social constructions arising out of Orthodoxy’s 
experience of her beliefs. A canonical tradition has developed 
from these social constructions and this tradition is nothing less 
than the interpretation of these canons through a dialectical 
process of negotiation over existential issues. In the development 
of the canons there have always been divisions and conflicts 
within Orthodoxy over their interpretations. Within the Canon 
Law that resulted within Orthodoxy this difference is evident in 
the various jurisdictions that have developed, or, what some 
theologians have come to call the canonicity of the Orthodox 
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Church. Alexander Schmemann has observed what he classes as 
an abnormal and divisive development:  
For the first time in history division belongs to the very 
structure of the Church, for the first time canonicity seems 
strangely disconnected from its fundamental ‘content’ and 
purpose – to assure, express defend and fulfill the Church 
as Divinely given Unity, for the first time, in other terms, 
one seems to find normal a multiplicity of 
‘jurisdictions.’216  
Ivan Žužek presents a contemporary understanding of 
canon law as it effects the social construction of the Church. In the 
Foreword to, A Guide to the Eastern Code, he writes that both 
codes, Latin and Oriental, comprise one corpus which “is merely 
an instrument for the achievement in the universal Church of that 
tranquility of order (illum tranquilitatus ordinem) which renders 
life in the ecclesial society easier.”217 Relationships within 
Orthodoxy, disclosed as phenomenological social constructions, 
illustrate how the application of Canon Law varies across different 
categories of people, time and history. How social construction of 
relationships reflect collective interests, how the interpreters justify 
their usage of the canons and how the community tries to regulate 
the activities to which the canons are applied are the focal points of 
Orthodox phenomenological social construction. 
In phenomenological social construction universality, as a 
concept, is problematic when interpreting social relationships. Not 
all relationships exist in all cultures to the same degree with the 
same significance or importance. Therefore, our attention must be 
focused on particular existential situations that constitute the 
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phenomenon. Steven Engler points out that “one of the main values 
of a properly elaborated constructionist theory is that it specifies 
more clearly just how specific concepts and categories come to be 
constructed in specific contexts.”218 Social construction in the 
interpretation of the canons, that is, deciding what one is to do in 
light of the canons connotes an allegiance to the theological 
principles that are shared by most, if not all, those who undertake 
the interpretation of the canons. However, this allegiance to 
theological principles does not imply a corresponding theory of 
universal governance. I suggest, then, that canonical social 
construction is initially and fundamentally an activity that analyses 
the constitution of a specific phenomena of human experience. 
Subsequent universal application may or may not be appropriate 
depending on the universality of the individual human experience.  
 
Orthodox Social Construction One: The Language of 
Interpretation of the Canons is Participatory Language, 
not Descriptive Language  
 
Our language reflects an understanding of our 
pastoral point of view. The main object of concern in 
interpreting the canons is the inner disposition and intention 
behind one’s actions for the community’s well-being. Given 
the sinful condition of all members of a community the 
interpretation of the canons is to safeguard the interests of the 
community from the intervention of those whose intentions 
and actions may be harmful to the community. From this 
motivation canons emerged during the earliest times in 
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response to the needs of the ecclesiastical community. 
Canons are thus rooted in a participatory activity based on the 
existential needs of the community, not on a theoretical 
understanding within the community. These existential needs 
included the purpose of seeking “to correct and reform the 
repentant sinner and to protect the community from the 
resulting sin.”219 This is significant since a sense of sin has 
been somewhat lost in the contemporary Western theological 
context. Prof. Michael Melchizedek notes that “Orthodox 
Canon law is corrective in nature (responding to a situation 
once it has occurred) and not prescriptive in character 
(anticipating a situation before it actually takes place).” This 
understanding reflects that sin is understood within the holy 
canons as an ecclesial issue and not as a private one.220 
Eugenio Corecco lends further support to this purpose of 
canon law when he writes: 
Canonical discipline also guarantees the objectivity of the 
ecclesial experience, as it teaches individual Christians 
and churches that they must overcome the temptation of 
individualism and that fidelity to communion is essential 
for the self-realization of the Church. 221  
Within the Western canonical tradition, the significance of sin 
plays a lesser part in the formation of the canons which deal with 
the governance of the Roman faithful. In its interpretative role 
the Codex Canonicus is to be a norm for the people because the 
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law is “an effective instrument to guide the life of the people of 
God. The Code is so rooted in the decrees of Vatican II that its 
practical intent should be obvious – the promotion of pastoral 
renewal and reform.”222 This intent of the Western Church is 
similar to what Alexander Schmemann notes as the intent of the 
canons in Orthodoxy. He writes that “canons do not constitute or 
create the church, their function is to defend, clarify and regulate 
the life of the Church, to make it comply with the essence of the 
Church.”223 
Participation in life, not a description of life, determines 
the “goods” of life. In interpreting the canons it is obvious that 
what is well intentioned and suited to one community’s 
participation may not be so well suited to another community’s 
participation. Similarly, what is good for the Church as a whole 
may not apply in local situations. In other words, what is good in 
one age may be a hindrance in another. Should universality, that 
is, the accepted interpretation by the Church as a whole come 
about this would mean that there can be no local departure in the 
interpretation of the canons. To avoid this difficult situation it 
helps to remember that the canons are pastoral texts written to 
address specific needs of the community and guide the spiritual 
life of its members at a given time in the church’s historical 
development. The canons do not merely describe the Church’s 
past life. Patrick Viscuso, notes that Matthew Blastares, a monk 
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of the Order of St Basil, who lived in the 14th Century and 
studied theology and canon law, was of this opinion. 224 
In the process of interpreting the canons one cannot use 
criteria at variance with the living tradition of the Church. In 
fact, as Spencer Estabrooks of the St. Arseny Institute, 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, has written that the interpretation of the 
canons of the Church cannot be separated from the Church’s life 
for such an interpretation would lead people to be satisfied with 
detailed laws and thus forget the goal and “norm” or standard of 
the Gospel.225 This concern increases as Orthodoxy, or any 
ecclesial corporation, adopts attitudes similar to the law and 
organization of the civil government which is based on secular 
administration experience. In North America, some areas where 
difficulties with social construction could occur are 1) over the 
English translations of the canons, 2) over the classification of 
the canons, 3) over the codification of the canons and 4) over the 
regular reception of communion in the Orthodox Churches. 
Difficulties over social construction in North America occur 
because most canonical material is only available in the 
European cites of Rome, Paris, Munich, and Strasbourg and has 
been written with an eye to the European context, not the North 
American context. European participation in the life of 
Orthodoxy differs from North American participation in the life 
of Orthodoxy. Within contemporary North American Orthodox 
theology interpretations from civil law are not to encroach and 
adversely affect the interpretation of the Church’s experience by 
her members. 
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The concern over the relationship between Orthodoxy 
and the State has important historical roots. It is a legacy, 
common to the Eastern and Western Churches, of the social 
construction of the “Church of Constantine” which 
overshadowed the “Church of Christ” in the lives of the 
Christian faithful. Anne Fremantle succinctly states the problem 
that the contemporary church has inherited. 
Many new problems arose for the Church when the 
emperors became Christian. The persecutions were over; 
the state was no longer hostile. But the Church’s 
relationship with a Catholic ruler was far more 
complicated than with pagan, or later, Saracen. For the 
emperors, in spite of their personal Christian faith, were 
also the inheritors of the Roman tradition, in which the 
state was paramount, and religion a department of that 
state.226 
Within Orthodox theology the canons exist to preserve a 
mystery. This differs from the Latin view. The canons are not to 
be understood as descriptive constitutional norms as has become 
the case in the Western tradition of canonical interpretation. In 
Orthodox theology there is no distinction between the jus 
divinum and the jus humanum as is the case with the Latin Codex 
Canonicus. As Lewis Patsavos notes:  
Within the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church, the 
Holy Canons are not the basis of the Church’s formation, 
but are derived from her following her formation. The 
Church was not established as a legal institution 
eventually filled with the grace of the Holy Spirit, but was 
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formed as the mystery of the the anthropic communion in 
Christ through the incarnation of the Logos.227  
Eugenio Corecco promotes this view when he writes:  
The Eastern Church has never surrendered to the 
temptation of separating the visible Church from the 
invisible one. In contrast to the Latin Church’s propensity 
to pay great attention to earthly ecclesial realities, the 
Orthodox Church has always preferred to contemplate the 
ontology of the ecclesial realities.228  
Within the context contemplating the ontology of 
ecclesial realities, or simply the Church, Panagiotes Carras 
understands the principle of oeconomia in the more ancient 
manner of “provision for” something as opposed to the more 
modern understanding of oeconomia as “exemption from 
penalty.” Oeconomia is the “application of a canon for a 
particular instance, a particular need that calls for particular 
attention. An oeconomia can never overthrow the canons, it can 
never be contrary to the essence, to the spirit, to the doctrine 
hidden behind the canon.”229 Phenomenological social 
construction arising from the application of oeconomia may be 
seen as “above all a living personal relationship with God; it is 
life that is truly life because it is a participation in the divine life 
itself, because it is a life of communion,” according to John 
Erikson.230  
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Orthodox Social Construction Two: The Epistemology of 
the Canons is of “Being,” not “Knowing.”  
 
William Shakespeare was not an epistemological 
philosopher but he was an insightful thinker. His literary legacy 
bears philosophical attention. Thus, we may consider Hamlet’s 
famous soliloquy: “To be or not to be, that is the question...” 
from a philosophical perspective.231 Hamlet did not say: “To 
know or not to know, that is the question....” In Shakespeare’s 
pre-Cartesian mind “being,” not “knowing,” establishes the 
identity of the person. It is the same within phenomenological 
social construction in that “being,” not “knowing,” establishes 
the identity of the person. We are first existential beings before 
we are philosophical knowers. Thus, we are beings who 
subsequently come to know the canons through our experience. 
From this perspective, Nicholas Afanasiev’s remarks about the 
historical existence and the essence of the Church are 
enlightening. 
We come to a very important conclusion: the 
interrelationship between the Church’s historical existence 
[knowledge of herself/canons] and her essence [her being] 
is such that the historical existence [knowledge of 
herself/canons] is that form in which the essence [the 
being] of the Church is embodied in history.232 
Thus, the canons express the concrete, socially constructed 
reality of the being of the church as a set of relationships among 
believers and God. I am not suggesting here that these 
relationships arise from a theoretical description of relationships 
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understood as knowledge of fixed categories to which we must 
conform. Rather, I am suggesting that the phenomenological 
reality constructed by these relationships is a dynamic and living 
socially constructed reality arising from reflections on the life of 
the Trinity. “The Church, like every Christian mystery, has her 
origin in the mystery of the unity and plurality of the Trinity, and 
it is in the Trinity that she has her ultimate explanation,” Corecco 
tells us.233 This is in keeping with the understanding that the 
church is a divine-human organism who distinguishes herself as 
a community from all other social organizations that are not 
constructed after the manner of the Trinity. 
Given a phenomenological understanding of the social 
construction of the canons of the Orthodox Church she cannot 
separate the jus divinum (divine law) from the jus humanum 
(human law) into distinct entities. The jus divinum and the jus 
humanum are only distinguishable. Together, as a 
phenomenological entity, they constitute the divine-human 
organism. Further, Orthodoxy never confuses decrees, which are 
legal interpretations, with canons. The former are classified as 
nomoi and the latter as kanones. However, when either decrees 
or canons are constructed socially or interpreted 
phenomenologically this reflects a creative attitude towards life. 
The view that canons are unchangeable or immutable amounts to 
a rejection of the creative dynamic of life, and ultimately of 
dynamic being. 
The phenomenological interpretation of the canons 
requires that one “search out those norms for structure and 
conduct that necessarily arise from and conform to the very 
nature of the Church as the Spirit-filled body of Christ,” 
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according to Erikson.234 In other words the Church gives the 
form and structure to the canons, not vice versa, that is, the 
canons giving form and structure to the Church. Thus, no 
juridical system will ever be completely adequate to express the 
true being of the Church which Christians only come to know 
through experience. There is an appreciation of Eastern theology 
within the Western Church when it comes to the interpretation of 
canon law. This is documented through the phenomenological 
approach, or stance, taken by some Western canonists. Ladislas 
Örsy remarks that “the study of hermeneutics makes the 
interpreter aware that there is more to a text than its conceptual 
and logical content” [Örsy’s italics].235 Since, strictly speaking, 
phenomenology is not a philosophical system but a philosophical 
stance, or attitude to life, it is able to transcend the limitations of 
all epistemological philosophies. Common to both Eastern and 
Western traditions is the notion that canon law is a guide for the 
faithful. This was noted above by the Western authors, James 
Coriden, Thomas Green and Donald Heintschel.236 The canons 
illustrate and illuminate the life of Christ in the community. Such 
illumination is beneficial for both the individual and the 
community since the Church as a divine-human organism is 
composed of members who are commissioned to carry out the 
threefold mission of Christ as priest, prophet and king. 
But what of the phenomenological existence of the 
Uniate Churches? one may ask. Uniate Churches are in favour of 
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adopting Latin discipline and adopting Roman Law suitable to 
their purposes. Thanks to the Orthodox branches of the Uniate 
Churches, however, “Latinization has made far less progress in 
the Eastern Catholic Churches of the Byzantium rite.”237 Yet, 
despite the positive affect of Orthodoxy some suspicion about 
Orthodoxy, on the part of the Uniate Churches, remains. Thus, 
Orthodox believers cannot fail to be suspect of overtures for 
unity made to them by the Roman Catholic Church. Ivan Žužek 
writes that “it is worth noting, despite the common declaration of 
Pope John Paul VI and the Ecumenical Patriarch Athenagoras of 
December 7, 1965, on the ‘consignment to oblivion’ of the 
anathemas of 1054, the canonical separation between the two 
Churches still exists.”238 In both East and West, theology and 
praxis often have developed independently of each other and this 
development has given rise to differing ecclesiologies and their 
systems of canon law. The differing ecclesiologies and systems 
of canon law contributed to the break which came at the great 
schism. In the West, “scholasticism has little by little hardened 
certain positions of St Thomas, thus making the dialogue with 
the Orthodox still more difficult.” 239 The hardening of certain 
positions has not shown any signs of softening in respect to 
dialogue with the Orthodox since 1968. The Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith, in 2007, issued a document in response 
to certain ecclesial questions, and responded “to these questions 
by clarifying the authentic meaning of some ecclesiological 
expressions used by the Magisterium which are open to 
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misunderstanding in the debate.”240 It concluded that the word 
“subsists,” referring to the Church of Christ, can mean that it 
subsists only, in its fullness, in the Catholic Church. The 
reference is clearly to the notion of “being” and not to the notion 
of “knowing” and thus remains problematic for Orthodox 
theologians. 
 
Orthodox Social Construction Three: Continual 
Interpretation, not Fixed Interpretation  
 
In light of what has been discussed above it is clear that 
any contemporary theological social construction requires of 
theologians a continual interpretation of experience. It is an 
unsatisfactory practice to rely on the theoretical and fixed 
interpretations of the past. Many theologians are expressing a 
need to up-date theological thinking as part of the larger Western 
societal experience. From this enterprise Orthodoxy is not 
exempt. Yet, to form a Code of Canon Law, in the Latin sense, 
for Orthodoxy as part of any theological up-dating would be 
contrary to the Eastern spirit. Various attempts at such 
theological up-dating have been made in the past and as recently 
as 1930. But nothing came of these attempts to establish a 
commission in which scholars of all Orthodox Churches would 
be represented. It is to be remembered that, within Orthodoxy, 
only an ecumenical council has authority to define dogma, 
impose obligatory discipline, introduce new or reform existing 
canons. Ivan Žužek notes that A. Christophilopoulos is also of 
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the opinion that a common Code for Orthodox churches is 
impossible because of the autocephalous character of each 
national church.241 
Canons and regulations, opinions and commentaries, 
arising from the late Byzantine period, often have no application 
to the altered conditions of contemporary Orthodox life. 
However, there are theological principles arising from the 
experience of the faithful that remain constant and must be 
addressed if the community is to continue to growth in the faith. 
This debate of how to interpret the canons requires a common 
focal point arising within contemporary experience. We 
experience ourselves in a dynamic and living environment that 
requires a dynamic and living interpretation, not a fixed 
interpretation. The past cannot act as a prison for Orthodoxy as 
John Meyendorff has remarked. 
The debate simply cannot be brought to a fruitful 
conclusion unless everyone acknowledges the rather 
obvious fact that both the Byzantine and the Ottoman 
empires do not exist anymore, and that the world to which 
Orthodox witness is to be made relevant is a world 
dominated by other powers and realities.242  
In fact, contemporary Orthodox social construction, like 
other sectors of Christianity, is in a period of re-evaluating and 
up-dating which, in practice, is closer to a ressourcement than an 
aggiornamento as was mentioned above. There are cultural 
changes taking place that require canonical regulation, that is, 
interpretation, with respect to the behaviour of the faithful in 
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light of gospel values. In fulfilling this purpose a return to the 
Patristic sources will provide a more adequate guidance for 
present-day interpretation than a mere up-dating of language and 
editing of legal texts. Certain Roman authors, living in the same 
western cultural matrix as Orthodox theologians, have expressed 
it this way. “Like other periods of church reform, the post-
Vatican II Church requires laws to stabilize long-term shifts of 
practice and discipline.”243 The reform of which they speak 
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PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE FUTURE OF ORTHODOX 
THEOLOGY  
 
General Summation  
 
I conclude this essay into phenomenology as an 
interpretive tool for the Orthodox theologian by way of a general 
summation. I propose that certain of the shifts that have become 
evident in the movement away from a scholastic Western 
philosophical understanding to an existential phenomenological 
philosophical interpretation support this claim. Two case studies 
of social construction in Orthodox theology were presented 
which formed a crucible to gage the activity in theological 
thinking currently taking place. I have shown that present 
theological activity occurring within Orthodoxy is affected by an 
evolutionary process in the philosophical way of thinking. This 
was demonstrated by examining two social constructions within 
Orthodoxy, ecology and canon law, through three “moments of 
interpretive activity.” One moment was language as 
participatory, not descriptive, the second moment was 
epistemology as being, not knowing and the third moment was 
interpretation as continual, not fixed. I noted that the human way 
of thinking, the thoughtful stance, is not limited to one cultural 
expression, but is reflected within a variety of cultural contexts. 
As a result humanity lives within an evolutionary and historical 
interpretation of its environment was unavailable to the ancient 
Hellenic philosophers, both Socratic and Presocratic. They had 
no knowledge of the phenomenological understanding of cultural 
expression in the thought processes of the human mind, nor in its 
social constructions. 
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Today, we recognize that there is a variety of ways of 
cultural contacts in which to understand our experience by 
rendering it concrete through social construction. In many 
contemporary social constructions a phenomenological approach 
replaces the metaphysical of classical philosophy in actualizing 
our understanding. Phenomenological philosophy has become an 
alternative understanding to traditional Western metaphysical 
epistemology. I have shown that interest in human activity in the 
world eventually gives rise to an understanding of a 
phenomenological social construction of the human 
environment. From a phenomenological perspective, human acts 
generate a conscious social construction on the part of the 
individual and on the part of the community. Phenomenological 
social construction does not arise from theory. Therefore, in 
understanding social construction theologically, we must no 
longer seek truth in theoretical representations but, rather, we 
seek to experience truth by leaving the question of truth open so 
that God may freely act in conjunction with humans. 
A phenomenological approach to theological 
understanding does not “encapsulate” theological understanding. 
To encapsulate theological understanding is a return to 
theoretical understanding of the scholastic perspective. The 
phenomenological approach liberates, not constrains, human 
understanding as it introduces new perspectives. The Orthodox 
theologian seeks to experience truth from the standpoint of the 
Gospel and tradition from a non-encapsulated existential 
perspective. We have seen that, in the European and American 
philosophical climate, developments in thinking are taking place 
that reflect less of the Aristotelian perspective and disclose more 
of the phenomenological (Continental) perspective. We have 
also seen that this phenomenological climate aids Orthodox 
theological interpretation. 
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In the Western context religious interpretation, in 
general, is moving from a predominately objective point of view 
to a more subjective point of view. This movement, with its 
various interpretations, within contemporary belief, in both Latin 
and Orthodox Churches, generates a lack of uniform social 
construction and lacks a single institutional religious praxis. We 
have seen that Orthodoxy was never totally dominated by 
classical philosophy, yet, it has not totally escaped the societal 
influence generated by the modern pluralistic way of thinking 
and belief. As a result contemporary Orthodox belief, as 
influenced by modern thinking, seems to have abandoned many 
earlier social constructions of Orthodox religious traditions 
understanding them as antiquated and meaningless. But, the case 
is, as phenomenology continues to introduce new philosophical 
perspectives into Western and Eastern religious belief, Orthodox 
theologians continually review their philosophical perspectives 
to remain faithful to the theological notion of semper 
reformanda in their social constructions. 
Since religious social construction carries the intended 
meaning and does not create meaning, the problem is a 
qualitative, hence, personal one and not a theoretical or 
impersonal one. The intended meaning to be reflected in 
Orthodox theological social constructions is susceptible to 
recognition by other like minds. In this recognition, Orthodox 
social construction is not constituted by a specific definition of 
religious truth but invites an existential understanding on the part 
of the theologian in experiencing of truth. In the experience of 
truth it must be noted that existential anxiety will most likely be 
present in varying degrees in any belief system. The Orthodox 
theologian’s experience of alienation, due to the ontological 
dichotomy between religious understanding and experience, 
gives rise to varying degrees of legitimate theological 
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uncertainty. Such anxiety may be resolved by engaging in an 
appropriate phenomenological and qualitative interpretation, 
rather than relying on a somewhat foreign philosophical ideology 
characteristic of the West. 
We have seen that phenomenological interpretive 
anxiety may be overcome to a great degree through an 
intentional reconciliation among God, ourselves and all 
humanity. This reconciliation reflects the Orthodox spiritual 
understanding that humanity has never been separated from that 
which is divine. I conclude that the Orthodox theologian’s 
interpretive perspective, and subsequent social construction, 
generate meaning derived from the experience of the divine 
presence in the world. A reconciliatory interpretive approach 
does not merely describe the understanding of the divine 
presence in the world; it actively restores unity. Social 
constructions that restore unity are not based on mere 
descriptions but are actively crafted through human experience. 
Further, the intimations of a divine presence in human 
experience give rise to a certain expectation of encountering that 
presence on the part of all believers. 
As noted earlier, phenomenological philosophical 
thinking is being rediscovered in the Western philosophical 
world. Phenomenological philosophical thinking is an approach 
is similar to, but not identical with, an earlier method of 
interpretation, that is, the pre-scientific method. As we have seen 
this rediscovery leads to tension in theological interpretation 
between empirical thinking, which stresses facts and 
phenomenological thinking, which stresses values. This 
phenomenological tension is beneficial for Eastern theologians 
since the phenomenological interpretive approach is supported 
by the fact that contemporary Orthodoxy has a sufficient 
philosophical grounding to avoid the traditional mistakes of the 
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West. The phenomenological approach is, strictly speaking, 
neither purely rational nor purely empirical but it is a conscious 
interpretive combination of practical thinking and experience 
that is characteristic of Orthodoxy. 
The earlier schools of theology, which came into being 
before the recognition of a multifaith theology, had already 
defined the word ‘theology’ from a Judeo-Christian perspective. 
Thus, theology has been identified with committed Judeo-
Christian studies, whereas, religion has been identified with the 
uncommitted study of religious belief. Phenomenology is not 
concerned solely with the uncommited study of religion but also 
with the committed study of theology. An advantage of the 
phenomenological approach, given our contemporary concern 
with individuality, is its potential for the self-revelation of the 
interpreter. This self-revelation of the interpreter cannot be 
accomplished in the uncommitted study or of religion. In the 
committed study of theology as we interpret the interpretations 
of others we find something similar our own experience in their 
accounts. In interpreting theology, it must be remembered that 
the phenomenological approach is only one of a number of 
methods of interpretation, nor does not present itself as a 
philosophical system. 
Given phenomenology’s diversity of understanding, no 
one group of phenomenologists enjoys a monopoly in 
interpretation. Orthodox theologians experience this diversity in 
phenomenological interpretation in a context of existentialist 
philosophy which has a wide response among individuals. This 
is in contrast to other modes of contemporary philosophy, 
particularly New Age philosophies, which require a high degree 
of conformity in thinking. I conclude that in the development of 
phenomenology something greater than mere adaptive change 
occurs within the phenomenological interpretive approach. 
 123
Along with the adaptive change, an essential change occurs in 
the person as well. This essential change generates a re-
structuring of the personal and collective understanding of the 
individual. The re-structuring of the personal and collective 
understanding of the individual alters the subject, as well as, the 
perceived object. In a scholastic interpretive approach the object 
of interpretation, the independent Platonic ideal, is not altered. In 
a phenomenological interpretive approach the web of meanings, 
which affects the social construction of theological meaning, is 
altered. The social construction of these meanings places 
emphasis on dynamic intersubjectivity. Thus, a religious 
phenomenological interpretation brings about a spiritual self-
transformation. But such a phenomenological spiritual self-
transformation is not recognized by all theologians. Many still 
seek truth as expressed in theoretical terms that have become 
fixed in a particular form of expression that is itself perceived to 
be as valid as the truth. 
I note that the Western experience of the scientific way 
of knowing is the present fashionable way of knowing. However, 
I recommend the alternative, the phenomenological way of 
knowing, to Orthodox and Latin theologians. Phenomenological 
understanding is a new kind of qualitative knowing which 
incorporates analytical thinking into one’s experience. A 
phenomenological approach generates social construction out of 
personal experience, the truth of which has no extramental 
existence. A phenomenological interpretation remains open to 
the future while rooted in the present. Enlightened Orthodox 
phenomenological theologians understand that the preservation 
of former conceptualizations of experience are not necessary and 
that such openness to the future is possible for persons or 
communities who have come to know who they are in the 
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investigation of these issues was carried out by the author. On 
the whole the book is a credible presentation of the significant 
issues separating Orthodox and Catholic thought over significant 
theological points of view. However, as a Roman Catholic, I 
suggest that non-Catholic readers not overlook the author’s own 
disclaimer. In the Preface he writes: “My analysis of the 
differences between Orthodoxy and Protestantism was rooted in 
my own experience. My knowledge of Roman Catholicism, 
however, is entirely second-hand.”  
 
Jeanrond, W. G. Theological Hermeneutics: Development and 
Significance. New York: Crossroad, 1991.  
This is a survey book written within an interdisciplinary 
perspective. It is concise and focuses on the relationship between 
phenomenology and theology, thus providing an excellent 
orientation within theological phenomenology. The author is 
conscious that Christian interpretation takes place within a 
pluralistic context.  
 
Michalopulos, G. and H. Ham. The American Orthodox Church: 
A History of its Beginnings. Salisbury, MA: Regina Orthodox 
Press, 2003.  
This book, though not bearing on the immediate subject matter 
of this dissertation, is an interesting one to read. It assisted this 
 125
researcher in appreciating some of the cultural background and 
historical conflicts of the establishment of Orthodox in America.  
 
Morris, T. V. (ed). The Concept of God. (Oxford Readings in 
Philosophy) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.  
This is an edited work on recent philosophical theology which, 
according to the editor, “has shed a great deal of light on both the 
nature and implications of a good many traditional theistic 
affirmations.” The writers attempt to conceive God in non-
classical categories which reflect diversity and commonalities 
within the modern experience.  
 
Meyendorff, J. [ed. N. Lossky] The Orthodox Church: Its Past 
and Its Role in the World Today, [4th rev ed]. Crestwood, 
NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1996.  
While interesting and informative from an historical point of 
view, this book like those written by other Orthodox authors 
annotated in this list, contributes little to the topic addressed in 
this dissertation. That is, there is little of a philosophical and 
theological discussion in the chapters of the book. Though 
Meyendorff does note: “Elements of Byzantine theological 
scholarship, however, continued to be maintained by a handful 
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